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Considering the ever-rising threat of terrorist attack and disruption of the 
economy and of daily activity, the potential strength of a radiological dispersion device 
must be evaluated.  A “dirty bomb” is a weapon in the terrorist arsenal that is highly 
effective in creating chaos, panic and disruption.  All of the immediate deaths caused by a 
“dirty bomb” are due to blast effects, however the public association with radiation and 
nuclear devices is one of fear and hyperbole.  The individuals and agencies that respond 
to this type of event will have the greatest impact on the general public.  By looking at 
case studies and potential scenarios or exercises the first responder can appreciate the 
nature of radiation as well as its impact on response.  The goal of this paper is to provide 
first responders with basic information on nuclear physics and expose relevant issues in 
responding to a radiological dispersion device.  An understandable link between nuclear 
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Figure 1. EPA Map of radon zones.  Zone 1 counties have a predicted average 
indoor radon screening level greater than 4 pCi/L.  Zone 2 counties have a 
predicted average indoor radon screening level between 2 and 4 pCi/L.  
Zone 3 counties have a predicted average indoor radon screening level 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The "battlefield" of the twenty-first century is no longer confined to locations 
where massed armies or navies confront each other.  One of the most unpleasant facts of 
the world today is the prevalence of unconventional warfare where civilians and civil 
infrastructure are targeted.  In many instances, these are manifest as terrorist acts.  
Because of media coverage and the associated publicity, the most spectacular criminal 
terrorist acts are committed, not necessarily to induce the greatest numbers of casualties, 
but to have the greatest psychological impact upon the general public.  “Dirty Bombs” or 
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) may be used as a means to these ends because in 
the eye of the public they are associated with nuclear weapons, fall out and with cancer 
susceptibility.  Historical cases have also shown that the general public typically responds 
fearfully and ignorantly to incidents that involve the use of nuclear or radioactive 
materials.  This report will provide scientific understanding of radioactivity and the 
material used for making dirty bombs, as well as consideration of possible scenarios and 
some historic examples, to provide a realistic assessment of RDD’s and their effects. 
In most cases, a dirty bomb combines a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, 
with radioactive materials.  The conventional explosive is constructed in such a way as to 
disperse radioactive material in the surrounding environment.  (This report does not deal 
with specific technical aspects of bomb design or fabrication.  It assumes a bomb has 
been built that incorporates radioactive material.)  Ideally, the radioactive material is in 
a powdered form so that it will be blown around by the expanding gasses from the 
explosion and eventually be inhaled by people.  Contamination is not only damaging 
when inhaled by people, it poses an external hazard to individuals as well.  Radioactive 
dust can deposit on buildings and other structures to promote further economic damage 
and stigma.  While radiation can be dangerous and even life threatening, immediate 
lethality is almost always due to the conventional explosive.  Most likely, the amount of 
radiation is insufficient to kill people or even cause severe illness.  In most cases, the 
primary concern is to treat life-threatening injuries first and then deal with factors 
associated with radioactivity.  
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Following a radiological dispersal device event, the most prudent action is to 
move away from the immediate area and seek shelter inside in order to reduce exposure 
to radioactive airborne dust.  Typically, an explosive event lends itself well to this type of 
action because people instinctively move away from an area that has experienced an 
explosion.  In the case of an RDD attack the first responder can be grateful for this type 
of instinctive action, because radioactivity is odorless, tasteless, and cannot be seen by a 
human eye.  An explosion itself will not indicate a dirty bomb, as fundamentally there is 
nothing different between a wholly conventional explosive and that of a dirty bomb.  
However, if a radiological attack is suspected, removing potentially contaminated 
clothing and showering in addition to remaining inside will help to reduce further 
contamination.  Saving contaminated clothing in a sealed plastic bag will allow for later 
testing and a determination of exposure. 
A dirty bomb should be considered a strategic weapon, not a tactical one.  The 
perceived threats of a radiation and anything nuclear, combined with real threats make 
this weapon one of mass disruption and of fear rather than of mass destruction.  A 
radiological dispersion device is most disruptive when placed in an area that effects large 
numbers of people such as a business district, subway station, or entertainment district.  
By striking one of these targets not only would many people be directly affected, but also 
the lasting consequences mean decreased traffic and productivity in the area.    
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In the event of a dirty bomb attack, the immediate danger is not radioactivity.  
With this realization about priorities of concern, it must be recognized that dirty bombs 
could contaminate relatively large areas, causing panic, creating fear and requiring costly 
and difficult cleanup efforts.  Truly the relatively small amount of radiation released by a 
radiological dispersion device may be insignificant when compared to other more far-
reaching consequences.  An entire city central could be contaminated beyond acceptable 
levels prompting very large and specialized decontamination efforts.  Some structures 
could be rendered permanently contaminated and have to be quarantined or destroyed and 
carried away to a special storage site.  Even if an area is completely decontaminated, the 
economic loss to the area or even the entire city could be very consequential.  People tend 
to be afraid of radioactivity, business would loose patrons and they may never return.  
Simple education about the general physics concerning the realities and details of dirty 
bombs and their associated radioactivity can help considerably in deciding how to 
respond sensibly to a radiological dispersal device event. 
 
B. HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 
During the Cold War the term dirty bomb was coined to describe a nuclear 
weapon exploded close to the earth’s surface resulting in radioactive products mixing 
with surface materials and spreading radioactive fallout far and wide.  “Cleaner” bombs 
were made possible by higher altitude detonation in which the fireball did not come in 
contact with the surface.  Truly dirty bombs have been envisioned wherein relatively 
short lived cobalt-60 or other radioactive isotopes could be incorporated into the bomb 
design to maximize residual radioactivity in the target area.  These “dirty bombs” result 
in nuclear explosions and are fundamentally different from the dirty bombs of concern in 
the context of a terrorist attack. 
In the context of this study, dirty bombs or radiological dispersion devices (RDD) 
are conventional explosives such as dynamite packaged with radioactive material that 
scatters when the bomb detonates.  A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast 
of the conventional explosive, while airborne radiation and contamination may provide a 
source for longer term physical and physiological effects.  Such bombs could be 
miniature devices or as large as a truck bomb.  Other types of crude devices may also be 
considered RDD’s, from a contaminated piece of material that is passed around to a 
contaminated bag or container left in a public space, even a crop duster loaded with 
radioactive material.  Terrorists have many options when it comes to distributing 
radioactive materials, but a fantastic explosion and the slightest mention of radioactive 
contamination generate real fear.   
Cursory perusal of magazine headlines show very little interest in “dirty bombs” 
until about March 2002.  Key to bringing the topic to the interest of the American public 
was the testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American Scientists, 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.i  In his testimony three scenarios of 
radiological attacks are presented with the conclusion that they constitute a credible 
threat; attacks could contaminate large urban areas; and large areas may need to be 
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evacuated even if radiation casualties are low.  A further analysis of the scenarios 
presented in his testimony is discussed later.  On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, aka Abdullah 
al-Muhajir, a 31-year old American, was arrested in Chicago, accused of being involved 
in a plot to place a radioactive dirty bomb in the Washington metro system.ii  After 
Kelly’s testimony and Padilla’s arrest, the media became filled with concerns about dirty 
bombs. 
The perception of the danger resulting from the effects of a dirty bomb can be 
traced to a general public fear of many things nuclear.  Besides the atomic bomb used in 
World War II, our experiences with the Three Mile Island reactor accident in 
Pennsylvania, the Chernobyl reactor accident in the Ukraine and the death of four people, 
including a six-year-old girl, from radiation sickness in Goiana, Brazil in September 1987 
have heightened public awareness of the possibility of radiological effects.  Despite the 
relative heightened awareness, the media tends to sensationalize these incidents blurring 
the actual facts and real concerns.   
The first-ever attempt at radiological terror is thought to have occurred in 
Ismailovsky Park in Moscow, Russia in November 1995.iii  A group of Chechen rebels 
contacted a Russian television station and boasted about their ability to construct a 
radioactive bomb.  They alerted the press and a 13.5 kg. (30 lb) cache of cesium filled 
radiological material was found partly buried, though much of that 13.5 kg source was 
likely shielding material.  Chechen separatists gave the location of three other sites where 
radiological materials had been placed and stated that these sites also held conventional 
explosives.  These were not found.  The individuals who planted the cesium-137 in 
Ismailovsky Park have not been identified nor has the original source of the material.   
In December 1998, the head of the Russian backed Chechen Security Service, 
Ibragim Khultygov, appeared on Chechen TV and announced that a container “full of 
radioactive substance and a mine attached to it” was found some 15 km east of Grozny, 
the Chechen capital.  The mine was deactivated, without much information given, but 
Chechen rebel involvement was suspected.iv  The existence of a rebel explosive 
workshop near the suburb of Argun, headed by warlord Shamil Basayev, gave credence 
to the suspicion. 
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Outside of these two instances, there have been other reports of seizures of dirty 
bomb material in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, and elsewhere.v,vi Recently, one 
of these reports dealt with the seizure of metal containers, holding cesium-137 and 
strontium-90, during a raid near the country’s capital of Tbilisi, on May 31, 2003.  It is 
suspected that containers were to be transported out of the country to Turkey where they 
could be resold.  The final market for the materials may have been Chechnya.  Along 
with the containers, police also discovered a glass capsule containing Yprite, or mustard 
gas.  Mustard gas incorporated into a dirty bomb, combined with explosives and 
radioactive materials could cause an increasingly dangerous and frightening affect.    
It is reported that the seized containers held three curies of cesium and 12 
microcuries of strontium.  Though the amounts may sound large, the physical quantities 
involved were of the order of 34 milligrams of cesium and 1.7 milligrams of strontium.  
In contrast, the largest known seizure of weapons-grade uranium from the former Soviet 
Union was also in Georgia.  Police arrested three men in 2001 attempting to sell nearly 
four pounds of uranium-235.  Again, this may seem like a large amount of material, 
however this constitutes 35 millicuries of activity and less than 4% of the material 
necessary to create a Hiroshima type nuclear bomb.  Even in an advanced government 
facility, this is still only about 12% of the material needed for a sophisticated modern 
nuclear weapon. 
 
C. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
On March 6, 2002, Dr. Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American 
Scientists (FAS) presented testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations.vii  His testimony increased the level of public awareness and alerted people of 
the real possibility of a radiological attack.  In his testimony, he presented three RDD 
scenarios:  dispersal of cesium from a medical gauge, of a cobalt source from a food 
irradiation plant and of americium from an oil well surveying instrument.  Comparison 
was made to Chernobyl and to EPA safety guidelines.  Analyzing these scenarios from a 
separate viewpoint finds that the general conclusion is one of weapons of mass disruption 
and mass misinformation, rather than mass destruction.   
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Knowledge of shielding requirements for the handlers, of newer studies of the 
Chernobyl aftermath and the recognition that NRC safety guidelines are based upon 
almost assured negation of cancer possibility for population in a lifetime, present a more 
realistic view of practical risk assessment.  Regulations attempt to provide a strict legal 
limit on exposure, but the reality is that each individual responds differently to a given 
exposure.  Legal limits provide a working basis for evaluations and attempt to keep 
people safe.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dictates that the occupational 
limit, assumed to be the limit for safe exposure in the event of an RDD, is 5 rems per year 
(0.05 Sv per year).viii  Further discussion of biological affects, exposure, and radiation 
units are contained later in this report.  The important thing to realize is that the actual 
results of exposure combined with the legal limits need to be considered for practical risk 
assessment.       
The biggest challenge faced by the isotopes examined by Dr. Kelly, americium-
241, cesium-137 and cobalt-60, lies in the relatively long half-life, 432, 30 and 5.3 years 
respectively.  While people can evacuate a contaminated area and can even be treated for 
contamination, contaminated soil and structures may be impossible to clean and remain 
radioactive for hundreds of years.   
 
D. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Although radiological dispersion devices constitute a threat to which the general 
public must be aware, for the first responder the general consideration should be reaction 
to the conventional explosive effects.  There is always a statistical possibility of incurring 
damage by radiation effects, but they pale in comparison to the immediate danger of 
injury and death from conventional effects.  Recent history has shown the increasing 
interest of individuals and groups in obtaining radiological material for the production of 
RDD’s.  The existence of unsecured or easily accessible radiological material has 
prompted terrorists to seek these materials because of the fear they can impose upon the 
general public.  However, as the interest in radiological material increases, more and 
more governments seek to control and account for radioactive sources.  Determined 
individuals will always be able to obtain prohibited material, however the consequences 
must be determined by looking at the problem from many perspectives.  Analysis of 
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potential RDD scenarios shows that dirty bombs are likely to be more effective as a tool 





























































 Any discussion of radioactivity and radiation must contain definitions of 
quantities and units.  Understanding the relative size of a millirem (mrem) or Curie (Ci) is 
necessary, as is understanding that the two terms describe different physical occurrences.  
Differentiation between activity, exposure, dose, dose rate, and effective dose, among 
others, must be made.  Differentiation between statutory guidelines and physical cause 
and effect must be made.  Traditional units, still commonly used in the United States, 
including (rem) and (rad) are defined in SI units as Sievert (Sv) and Gray (Gy) 
respectively.  In radiation physics involving human beings, numbers with one or two 
significant figures mean more to the first responder than the precision of many significant 
figures.  Despite a meter’s capability of displaying five significant figures, the first 
responder will find it unnecessary to report all digits.  Precision numbers belong in the 
laboratory and in technical reports, not in the operational world of the first responder. 
 
B. RADIOACTIVITY 
Radioactivity is the term used to describe the process in which an unstable 
nucleus releases excess energy.  Atoms, or more precisely, isotopes of atoms exist that 
have too few or too many neutrons to be stable.  An unstable nucleus tends to fall apart or 
decay, hence the term radioactive decay.  There are a number of types of particles or 
photons in which a nucleus can release to diffuse its excess energy.  These particles and 
how they decay are discussed later in the paper.  Many times, an unstable nucleus decays 
into another unstable nucleus thereby creating what is known as a decay chain.  Natural 









The activity1 of a radioisotope source is defined as its rate of decay.  The 
historical (English) unit of activity is the curie2 (Ci), defined as exactly 3.7 x 1010 
disintegrations per second.  Originally, the curie was an estimate of the activity of one 
gram of pure radium-226 (226Ra).  A curie represents a relatively large source; more 
appropriate for typical laboratory work are the submultiples, the millicurie (mCi = 1/1000 
of a Ci) and the microcurie (µCi = 10-6 Ci).  Since 1975, the becquerel3 (Bq) is defined as 
one disintegration per second.  Therefore, a curie is 3.7 x 1010 Bq.  
It must be emphasized that activity measures the source disintegration rate and is 
not synonymous with the energy released by that activity.  Determining whether or not a 
source is “dangerous” depends upon the particular radioisotope being considered. 
A useful concept is the specific activity, which is defined as the activity per 
unit mass of the radioisotope sample.4   
Take for example, 10 kg of weapons grade uranium, U-235 versus 1 g of 
strontium-90, a radioactive isotope used in former Soviet generators, and see which one 
                                                 
1 The fundamental law of radioactive decay is: The activity, dN/dt = -λN, where N is the number or 
radioactive nuclei and λ is defined as the decay constant. λis 1/τ, where t is the mean life, related to the 
half-life, t1/2 by τ =, t1/2 / ln 2.  Consequently, the activity is proportional to the amount of radioactive 
material and is greater for those radionuclides with short half-lives.  The half-life is defined as the time in 
which a sample of radioactive nuclei will decay to half its original amount. 
2 The Ci is named in honor of Marie Curie, nee Maria Sklodowska, (1859 – 1906), who won two 
Nobel prizes, one in Physics and the other in Chemistry.  Her 1911 Nobel Chemistry prize was awarded for 
her discovery and isolation of radium.  Marie Curie’s daughter Irene married Frederic Joliet and the two 
jointly won the Chemistry Nobel prize in 1935.  Marie’s younger daughter, Eve, married the American 
Henry R. Labouisse.  They were active in UNICEF when he accepted the 1965 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf 
of the United Nations Children’s Fund. 
3 The Bq is named in honor of Antoine Henri Becquerel (1852 – 1908) who was awarded half the 
Nobel Prize in Physics in 1903 for is discovery of natural radioactivity I 1896.  The other half of the Nobel 
Prize was shared with husband and wife team Pierre and Marie Curie for their study of Becquerel radiation. 






ActivitytivitySpecificAc λλ ===  
Symbol Name Description 
λ Radioisotope Decay Constant ln2/half-life  
N Number of Nuclei   
M Molecular Weight of Sample   
Av Avogadro's Number 6.02 x 1023 nuclei/mole 
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is more dangerous on a strictly a radioactive basis.  The specific activity of U-235 is 
1.922x10-6 Ci/g, thus 10 kg will have an activity of 19.2 mCi (milli-Curies)  
(10kg) * (1000 g/kg) * (1. 922x10-6 Ci/g) = 19.2 mCi 
The specific activity of Sr-90 is 139.4 Ci/g, thus 1 g will have an activity of 139.4 
Ci 
(1g) * (1000 g/kg) * (139.4 Ci/g) = 139.4 Ci 
Despite the fact that we have 10,000 times as much uranium as strontium, the 
strontium is nearly 10,000 times as radioactive as the uranium.  Specific activity gives us 
an immediate sense of the relative radioactivity without going through this calculation 
every time.  You can see why a very small sample of Sr-90 would be more dangerous 
than a large amount of uranium in a radiological dispersion device.  Sr-90 is not used to 
make nuclear weapons, as U-235 is, however a radiological dispersion device is much 
simpler to produce than a nuclear weapon.  Specific activity is also important because 
you cannot estimate the strength of a source based solely on its physical size. 
 
D. TYPES OF RADIATION 
Radiation is a term used to describe many different types of energy, which is 
shuttled around the universe all the time.  Radiation is as common as visible light or 
ultraviolet and infrared light.  AM and FM radio waves, constantly bouncing around, are 
also a specific type of radiation.  The radiation that we are concerned with is called 
ionizing radiation, which carries much more energy than the other types of radiation 
mentioned.  The purpose of a radiological dispersion device is to spread contamination, 
which will place human targets in the path of ionizing radiation.  Ionizing radiation is 
dangerous because it has enough energy to knock electrons from atoms, ultimately 
causing damage to human cells and potentially causing mutations in strands of DNA. 
1. Ionizing Radiation   
The concern with radiation in the context of a “dirty bomb” is ionizing radiation.  
Ionizing radiation is that radiation capable of freeing an electron from an atom or 
molecule creating a charged species and free electrons.  These particles can go on to 
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interact with other atoms and molecules to create additional charged species.  Radiation 
can be conveniently categorized into the general types:  charged particulate radiation, 
which includes fast electrons and heavy charged particles, and uncharged radiation, 
which include electromagnetic radiation and neutrons. 
Fast electrons include beta particles (positive and negative charge) emitted in 
nuclear decay.  Heavy charged particles include all energetic ions with mass of one 
atomic mass unit or greater, such as alpha particles, protons, and fission products.  The 
electromagnetic radiation of interest includes X-rays emitted in the rearrangement of 
electron shells of atoms and gamma rays, which originate from transitions within the 
nucleus itself.  Neutrons generated in various nuclear processes can be further subdivided 
into slow neutron and fast neutron subcategories. 
Ionizing radiation includes a wide range of energies, from10 eV to multiple MeV.  
The lower energy bound is set by the minimum energy required to produce ionization in 
typical materials.  The upper bound is arbitrary, but is chosen to include energies one 
might encounter in dealing with radiation dispersal devices.  Neutrons can be much lower 
in energy to have an effect, because of their uncharged nature.  Neutrons, however, 
require separate study and are not usually of direct concern in radiological dispersal 
devices.  Naturally formed isotopes emit only alpha, beta and gamma rays.  Neutrons are 
a concern only in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor or nuclear bomb. 
2. Alpha Particles 
Alpha particles are massive charged particles (4 times the mass of a neutron), and 
are identical to the nucleus of a helium atom.  Because of their size, alpha particles 
cannot travel far, only about two inches in air, and are fully stopped by the top layer of 
skin or by clothing.  While, alpha particles are negligible as external hazards, they can 
cause significant cellular damage in the region immediately adjacent to their physical 
location and consequently are of grave concern when ingested or inhaled.  They are 
assigned a quality factor Q of 20, which is discussed in more detail later.  
3. Beta Particles  
Beta particles are identical to electrons, though they originate from the nucleus 
and also include an anti-particle partner, the positron.  They travel a short distance in 
tissue, and in large quantities can produce a lesion, called a “beta burn” which can appear 
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similar to a thermal burn.  Beta particles are emitted from a radioactive nucleus when 
either one of two conditions applies.  A neutron is transformed into a proton or a proton is 
transformed into neutron.  In the event that a neutron decays to a proton, a β- is released.  
A β- is physically the same as an electron but the notation is used to designate its origins 
in the nucleus.  In the event that a proton decays to a neutron, a β+ is released.  A β+ is 
called a positron and is the anti-particle for an electron. 
4. Gamma Rays And X-Rays    
Gamma rays are uncharged electromagnetic radiation like microwaves, visible 
light or X-rays.  However, the frequency of the electromagnetic radiation is much higher 
than visible light, thus the overall energy is also much higher.  Because they are highly 
energetic, gamma rays pass relatively easily through materials.  In addition, due to high 
penetrability, gamma radiation can result in whole-body exposure. 
X-rays that we will consider may simply be low-energy gamma rays emanating 
from within the nucleus, or be the result of rearrangement of atomic electrons.  For most 
of our discussion we treat X- and γ- rays similarly. 
5. Neutrons 
Neutrons are uncharged and only emitted during fission or fusion, thus are not of 
concern in a dirty bomb attack.  However, when present, they have significant mass and 
interact with the nuclei of other atoms severely disrupting atomic structures.  Neutrons 
are assigned quality factors as high as 20. 
 
E. ENERGY 
When a nucleus decays, energy is released.  The traditional measurement of 
radiation energy is the electron volt or eV.  The eV is defined as the kinetic energy gained 
by an electron due to its acceleration through a potential difference of 1 volt.  The 
multiples, kiloelectron volt (keV) and megaelectron volt (MeV) are more common in the 
measurement of ionizing radiation. 
Our concern with radioactive sources deals with the production of ionizing 
radiation.  If there is insufficient energy to free atomic electrons from their nuclei, the 
radiation does not have the same potential for causing biological damage.  Ordinary 
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visible light is non-ionizing radiation.  X-rays are ionizing radiation.  Roughly energies of 
the order of tens of eV and higher can cause ionization. 
The SI (metric) unit of energy is the Joule (J), which is a macroscopic quantity.  
When dealing with nuclear processes, we deal with the energies associated with single 
nuclear events and the more appropriate unit of energy is the electron volt.  In SI units, 
radiation is more appropriately related to the submultiple, femtojoule (fJ) with the 
conversions shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1. Table of Useful Energies and Conversions 
 
Name Symbol Equivalent Joules Equivalent eV Equivalent Standard 
femtojoule fJ 10-15 J 6.241 x 103 eV 6.241 keV 
picojoule pJ 10-12 J 6.241 x 106 eV 6.241 MeV 
nanojoule nJ 10-9 J 6.241 x 109 eV   
microjolue mJ 10-6 J 6.241 x 1012 eV   
millijoule mJ 10-3 J 6.241 x 1015 eV   
joule J 1 J 6.241 x 1018 eV   
kilojoule kJ 103 J 6.241 x 1021 eV   
 
Damage is caused in the body when bonds between important atoms or molecules 
are broken.  Energy given off during radioactive disintegration, in the form of X-rays or 
gamma rays is enough to break up essential biological molecules.  The energy packets of 
photons (i.e. microwave, infrared, visible light, x-rays and gamma rays) are characterized 
by their frequency (ν) and wavelength ( λ ) and the product of the two equals the speed of 
light.  ν = c.  The frequency and wavelength determine the energy carried by each 
discrete photon, E = hν = hc/ λ .5 If a photon has sufficient energy to break an electron 
from the molecule, the remaining molecule is ionized and a radical results.  Radicals can 





                                                  
5 The symbol h stands for a numerical constant called Planck’s constant with the value, h = 6.626 x 10-
34J. s = 4.135x 10-15 eV. s.  Whenever Plank’s constant or ħ (h/2π) are used, one is dealing with quantum 
mechanical concepts and subjects that are on the atomic scale.  
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F. RADIATION EXPOSURE AND DOSE 
In radiation measurements, two concepts are important for consideration of 
radiation protection, they are exposure and dose.  Exposure refers to the amount of 
radiation present in an environment, while dose deals with the amount of radiation a 
subject absorbs. 
1. Exposure 
The concept of exposure was introduced early in the history of radioisotope 
research and may be considered analogous to the strength of an electric field created by a 
point charge.  The electric field exists regardless of whether there is another charged 
particle to feel its effect.  Gamma ray or X-ray exposure is expressed using the historical 
units Roentgen (R), defined as the exposure that results in the ionization of dry air such 
that 1 R = 2.58 x 10-4 C/kg of air.  This is equivalent to 1.61 x 1015 ion pairs created per 
kilogram of dry air.  (Since the air is ionized, there are an equal number of free charges 
with the opposite sign.)  With average pair formation energy of 34 eV, there is               
8.8 x 10-3 J absorbed per kilogram of dry air.ix  This unit was established in 1928 in honor 
of the discoverer of X-ray radiation, Wilhelm Konrad Roentgen. 
The exposure is therefore defined in terms of the effect of a given flux of gamma 
rays on a test volume of air.  It is a function of the intensity of the source, the geometry 
between the source and test volume, and the attenuation of the gamma rays between the 
two. 
In many instances, it is necessary to know the exposure rate, which is the amount 
of radiation per second in a particular spot.  The exposure rate, dX/dt, can be related to 
the activity, α, of the source, the distance, d, from the source and a constant, Γ, defined as 
the exposure rate constant for a specific radioisotope of interest.  Assuming there is no 
attenuation of gamma rays from source to target, then the following equation applies. 
dX/dt = Γα/d2 
The unit of the exposure rate constant, Γ, is R cm2 hr-1 mCi-1.  For example   
ΓCobalt-60 = 13.7, Γ Iodine-131 = 2.2 and ΓIodine-125 = ~0.7.  The values of Γ reflect the relative 
energies of the gamma rays emitted by different radioisotopes.  Cobalt-60 emits gamma 
rays of energy 1.33 and 1.17 MeV; iodine-131, 0.365 MeV; and iodine-125, 0.036 MeV.  
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In practice, air attenuation would have a much greater effect on exposure because low 
energy gamma rays are also emitted by the radioisotopes and are more susceptible to 
attenuation. 
The relationship between exposure rate, activity and exposure rate constant shows 
that activity alone is not a sufficient measure of how dangerous a radioisotope is. 
2. Dose 
Two different materials, if subjected to the same gamma-ray exposure, will in 
general absorb different amounts of energy.  The energy that is absorbed by any type of 
material is defined as the absorbed dose.  The historical unit for absorbed dose is the rad, 
meaning radiation absorbed dose and defined as 100 ergs/gram.  A rad is defined in the 
cgs (centimeter-gram-second) system of units.  The Systems Internationale, SI 
equivalentx that is especially prevalent outside the United States, is called the gray (Gy) 
defined as 1 joule/ kilogram.  The conversion between the two systems6 is given by 
1 Gy = 100 rad. 
Radiation absorbed dose (rad) does not specifically deal with biological damage; 
it refers only to energy absorbed by any type of material.  Biological damage is not solely 
caused by the energy deposited, but by ionization that creates radicals and can cause 
chemical reactions to occur.  Each type of radiation is associated with a quality factor, Q, 
which relates absorbed dose to the proper biological effects.  To put this concept into 
perspective 1 Gy or 100 rad, while a significant does to the whole body, is equivalent to  
0.24 cal/kg of material or 0.24 mcal/g7 of material.  However, one calorie of thermal 
energy is required to increase the temperature of one gram of water one degree 
                                                 
6 The CGS (centimeter-gram-second) system of units is typically used when dealing with 
electromagnetic or electrostatic systems in which quantities are derived from three dimensions, centimeter, 
gram and second.  The SI system of units is more universally accepted across many fields of discipline in 
which quantities are derived from four dimensions, meter, kilogram, second, and ampere.  1 meter = 100 
centimeters and 1 kilogram = 1000 grams, however there are often non-trivial conversions between the two 
systems. 
7 The energy conversion is represented in this table.  100 rad is converted to 0.24 cal/kg using 
appropriate conversion factors and by canceling units.  Vertical lines represent multiplication and dark lines 
show equality.   
100 rad 100 ergs/g 2.4x10-8 cal 2.4x10-4 cal 1000 g 0.24 cal 
 rad ergs g kg kg 
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centigrade.  Clearly the concept of absorbed dose and simple thermal energy deposition is 
insufficient to describe the biological effect on the human body. 
When the effects of radiation on living organisms are observed, the absorption of 
equal amounts of energy per unit mass under different irradiation conditions does not 
necessarily result in the same biological effect.  Biological effects are dependent on the 
alteration of molecules that are caused by ionization and molecular excitations caused by 
the radiation.  The severity and permanence of these changes are related to the local rate 
of energy deposition along the particle track.  This effect is quantified in terms of the 
linear energy transfer, L.8 In general the greater the linear energy transfer, the greater the 
biological effect.  The biological effectiveness is expressed by specifying the dose 
equivalent, H, which is the product of the absorbed dose, D, and a quality factor, Q that 
characterizes the specific radiation.   
H = DQ 
X-ray, γ-ray, and β-radiation have a quality factor of unity (Q=1).  Alpha particles 
have a quality factor of twenty (Q = 20).  Consequently for a given absorbed dose, alpha 
particles could result in a greater biological effect than the same absorbed dose due to an 
γ-ray. 
The unit for dose equivalent H depends on the corresponding absorbed dose as 
well as the type of organism absorbing the dose.  If the dose, D, is expressed in historical 
units of the rad and the body absorbing the dose is a human, then the dose equivalent, H, 
is expressed as rem, or roentgen equivalent man.  Under SI conventions, the Sievert (Sv) 
is the dose equivalent when dose is expressed in Gray (Gy).9  For example, an absorbed 
dose of 2 Gy delivered by radiation with Q of 10 will result in a dose equivalent of 20 Sv. 
                                                 
8 The linear energy transfer is nearly identical to the specific energy loss (-dE/dx) which is the energy 
lost by the radiation as it traverses through the material.  Linear energy transfer is the energy deposited 
locally as the ionizing radiation travels through the material.  The difference in energy between the two 
quantities arises because the specific energy loss includes energy lost through bremsstrahlung emission, 
which may travel a substantial distance from the particle track before depositing its energy.  Linear energy 
transfer includes only that energy deposited along the ionizing radiation’s track. 
9 The units Sievert is named after Swedish scientist, Rolf Sievert (1898-1966) who was instrumental in 
radiation protection and responsible for initiating Sweden’s first radiation protection law in 1941.  The Gy 
is named in honor of Englishman Hal Gray (1905-1965) who worked with Rutherford and contributed 
much to our knowledge concerning the absorption of gamma rays in matter. 
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H = DQ = (2 Gy) x (10) = 20 Sv 
The corresponding unit relationship for dose equivalent is similar to that of absorbed 
dose.   
1 Sv = 100 rem.   
Using a similar calculation for equivalent dose, the example above in historical units 
would be 200 rad delivered by radiation with Q of 10 resulting in a dose equivalent of 
2000 rem. 
 
G. BACKGROUND RADIATION 
Dose rate is simply the radiation dose per unit of time as in rem/min or Sv/min.  
The typical background dose rate for a human is about 360 mrem/year xi(3.6 mSv/year).  
Each and every day a person receives a certain amount of radiation from naturally 
occurring sources.  Our bodies are accustomed to receiving this natural radiation, as 
mentioned earlier; the average amount of radiation received by a person in one year is 
about 360 mrem.  Natural radiation comes from four different sources: cosmic, terrestrial, 
food, and radon.  It is important to note that natural radiation is exactly the same as 
radiation that comes from man-made sources.   
Cosmic radiation comes from our sun and from other outer space sources in the 
form of positively charged particles and gamma rays.  At higher altitudes less atmosphere 
means more cosmic radiation.  The average annual dose due to cosmic radiation is about 
28 mrem.   
Terrestrial radiation comes from sources in the ground and drinking water, such 
as radium, uranium and thorium.  The amount of terrestrial radiation a person receives is 
largely dependant on geographical location, however the average annual dose due to 
terrestrial radiation is around 28 mrem.   
Internal radiation due to food sources is a result of naturally occurring 
radioisotopes that are found in the food we eat.  The most common is K-40 (potassium-
40), but Na-24, C-14, and Ar-41 also contribute to radiation found in food.  The average 
annual dose from food is around 40 mrem.   
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Radon is a radioactive gas that is produced by radium and often collects in 
basements and cellars.  Radon is an alpha emitter so it must be ingested to pose any 
threat, but again because it is gaseous ingestion is relatively easy.  The average annual 
dose caused by radon is 200 mrem.xii  Radon exposure is the most significant contributor 
to background radiation but can vary by more than a factor of two depending on 
geographical location.xiii  Areas that have higher concentrations of uranium and thorium 
ores have higher amounts of radon.  Below is a map of the United States that shows the 
concentrations and distributions of radon in air as reported by the EPA. 
 
Figure 1.   EPA Map of radon zones.  Zone 1 counties have a predicted average indoor radon 
screening level greater than 4 pCi/L.  Zone 2 counties have a predicted average 
indoor radon screening level between 2 and 4 pCi/L.  Zone 3 counties have a 
predicted average indoor radon screening level less than 2 pCi/L. (From Ref.xiv) 
 
Manmade sources are another contributing factor in the amount of background 
radiation that the average person receives.  Radiation, no matter what the source is, 
natural or manmade is exactly the same in terms of its effects and properties.  Natural 
radiation does not necessarily mean safe radiation and manmade radiation is not 
necessarily dangerous.  The four major areas of manmade radiation include: medical 
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exposure; atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons; consumer products; and industrial 
applications.  The majority of radiation that comes from medical applications is from X-
rays.  A typical chest X-ray provides a dose of around 10 mrem, resulting in an average 
annual dose of 40 mrem.  Treating various cancers and other diseases as well as 
diagnosing and tracking chemicals in the body require radioactive isotopes.  As a result 
of these special techniques, the average annual dose is 14 mrem resulting in a total dose 
of 54 mrem from medical sources.  Atmospheric weapons testing ended in the United 
States in the early 1960’s and are now banned across most of the world.  Nuclear fallout 
provides very little radiation to the general population, less than 1 mrem.  The 
predominate fallout products include strontium-90 and cesium-137, both with half-lives 
of around 30 years, meaning more than half the products from the 1960’s are already 
gone.  Consumer products also contribute to a small portion of background radiation.  
Items such as TV’s, monitors, some old luminous watch dials, and household smoke 
detectors are sources of radiation.  The average annual dose from consumer products is 
10 mrem.  Industrial sources of radiation include, various gauges, non-destructive testing 
(radiography), laboratory work, and some mining applications.  Industrial exposure is 
very job dependent and for that matter is not included in the total average annual dose.   
    The nature of background radiation is very dependent on geographical location, 
the type of medical treatment you are or are not receiving, and the job that you do.  
Geographical location is important because of the different soil types in different areas.  
Some soils contain greater amounts of uranium, thorium and radium than others.  High 
amounts of radium will also mean more radon and uranium and thorium have other 
daughter products as well.  Industrial radiation exposure is dependent on job description.  
Some people work with machines that use radiation to test welds, evaluate pipe integrity 
and look for sources of weakness in materials.  Other industrial applications include 
density, thickness, or moisture gauges for production of materials such as papers or 
plastics or for evaluating moisture content in concrete and soils.  It is interesting to note 
that coal, oil, and natural gas fired power plants provide about twice the background 
exposure to radiation than do nuclear power plants.  The natural occurrence of uranium 
and thorium is released into the atmosphere when these fossil fuels are burned.xv    Even 
people with jobs that are predominately outdoors receive more radiation than those 
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people who work indoors.  People who often fly in jet aircraft, such as pilots and business 
travelers, are exposed to much higher levels of cosmic radiation because higher altitudes 
mean less atmospheric protection.   Below is a table that summarizes the average annual 
radiation dose for a person in the United States. 
 
Table 2. Sources and Amounts of Background Radiation (After Ref.xvi, xvii) 
  





    
Manmade Sources of Radiation   
Medical   
X-rays 40 
Diagnosis and Treatment 14 
Atmospheric Weapons Testing <1 
Consumer Products 10 
Industrial Uses Job dependant 
    
Total Average Annual Dose to 360 
the General Population   
 
 
H. INTERACTION MECHANISMS 
When radiation interacts with atoms energy is deposited resulting in ionization (or 
electron excitation).  Both direct and indirect interactions of radiation with cells can 
occur.  Radiation may directly hit a particularly sensitive atom or molecule and cause 
damage at that location.  The resulting damage may be irreparable causing the cell to 
either die or to malfunction.  Radiation can damage a cell indirectly by interacting with 
water molecules in the body.  The energy deposited in the water leads to creation of 
unstable, toxic hyperoxide (H2O2, etc.) molecules.  These can then damage sensitive 
molecules and afflict subcellular structures. 
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 I. EFFECTS OF A RADIATION DISPERSAL DEVICE 
In general the population is most familiar with acute high-dose radiation effects, 
which may occur near nuclear detonations and catastrophic reactor accidents.  This will 
be discussed later, however more pertinent to radiation dispersal devices is low dose-rate 
radiation.  Low dose-rate radiation is also a concern during situations involving industrial 
contamination. 
A radiation dispersal device is a conventional high explosive laced with a 
radioisotope, not a nuclear weapon.  The immediate concern should be the effect of the 
explosive, followed by that of the radioactivity.  The radioactivity will at most produce 
low dose-rate radiation and at worst late and delayed effects may occur depending on the 
particulars of the situation.  Some possible delayed consequences of radiation injury 
include: shortened life, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, chronic radiodermatitis, 
decreased fertility and genetic mutation.  The effect upon future generations is unclear.  
Data from Japan (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and Russia (Chernobyl) have not 
demonstrated significant genetic effects in humans.xviii   
Damage done by gamma radiation at low dose rate or in fractions over a long 
period of time allows tissues to repair.  For example, radiation treatment for cancer is not 
done at one time, but in a series of sessions.  A tumor is more sensitive to radiation than 
healthy cells, so as the treatment is carried out, the tumor shrinks in size while the normal 
healthy tissue is allowed to repair.  Damage resulting from neutron radiation, such as that 
resulting from a nuclear weapon, does not however appear to be dose-rate dependent.  
This is because of the high linear energy transfer of neutrons that cause disruptions that 
are locally much greater than gamma radiation, and repair mechanisms are hindered. 
Data pertaining to the type of effects one might expect from a dirty bomb may be 
obtained from experiences learned from Soviet nuclear weapons production.xix  In such a 
setting, annual doses of 2 to 4.5 Gy were received by the workers equivalent to doses on 
the order of 200 to 450 rem.  If this type of dose were delivered within a very short period 
of time, on the order of a minute or less, and no immediate medical treatment were given, 
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the survival rate of the dose recipient would be about 50 %.  Below is a table that 
summarizes the effects of an acute whole body dose. 
   




rem (Sv) Biological Effects 
0-50 (0-0.5) Little obvious effect except for possible minor blood changes 
80-120 (0.8-1.2) Vomiting and nausea lasting for about 1 day in 10% of exposed individuals.  Fatigue but no serious disability. 
130-170 (1.3-1.7) 
Vomiting and nausea in nearly all exposed individuals within 2 
days, followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness in 25% of 
individuals exposed.  No death is expected with treated individuals 
180-220 (1.8-2.2) 
Vomiting and nausea in nearly all exposed individuals within 1 
day, followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness in 50% of 
individuals exposed.  Up to 20% of untreated individuals die. 
270-325 (2.7-
3.25) 
Vomiting and nausea in nearly all exposed individuals within 1 
day, followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness.  Up to 50% 
of untreated individuals die within 2 months.  Survivors require 6-
month recovery. 
400-500 (4-5) 
Vomiting and nausea in nearly all exposed individuals within 1 
day, followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness.  More than 
50% of untreated individuals die within 2 months.  Survivors 
require 6-month recovery. 
550-750 (5.5-7.5) 
Vomiting and nausea in nearly all exposed individuals within 4 
hours, followed by other symptoms of radiation sickness.  Nearly 
all untreated individuals die with in 2 weeks. 
1000 (10) Vomiting and nausea within 1 to 2 hours.  Untreated patients probably do not survive 




In Soviet weapons production, the dosage was obtained over the course of a year.  
Diagnosis of chronic radiation syndrome (CRS) was observed in 1596 workers.  CRS is 
marked by leukophenia (both netrophils and lymphocytes depressed) and 
thrombocytopenia.  In severe cases, anemia, atrophic changes in the gastrointestinal 
mucus membranes, encephalomyelitis, and infectious complications due to immune 
depression were noted. 
CRS is highly unlikely to affect first responders because exposures over a short 
period of time are not linked to CRS.  4.5 Gy over a full year implies a dose rate of 0.51 
mGy/hour or 51 mrem/hour, continuously.  In this type of situation, the numbers imply 
that access to the contaminated area be restricted and personal working in the area be 
carefully monitored as to their accumulated dose. 
Near ground nuclear weapon detonation, radiation dispersion devices, major 
reactor accidents, or similar events that create contamination with high dose rate would 
permit development of CRS if the exposure were prolonged.  Evidence from the former 
Soviet Union suggest that once the patient is removed from the radiation environment 
clinical symptoms slowly resolve themselves and complete recovery is possible when the 
dose rate is low.   
As seen in this discussion, in the case of an RDD incident, the first responder will 
be in the area for much less than a fraction of a year so the main concern is to respond to 
the physical effects of the explosive device. 
Statistically, an individual already has a relatively high risk of developing cancer; 
in the United States it is about 20%.  The background risk of cancer makes it difficult to 
determine what the risk of cancer is resulting only from radiation exposure.  Exposure to 
100 mGy gamma radiation (twice the U.S. occupational annual limit of 0.05 Gy (5 rad)) 
causes the lifetime risk of death due to cancer to increase 0.8 %.  Thus, if 5000 
individuals are exposed to the expressed 100-mGy level, as might be possible in a rescue 
operation, the fatal lifetime cancer rate may increase from 1000 in the group to 1040.xxi  
However, these are statistical estimates and in that population the uncertainty in the 
number susceptible to lifetime cancer is +/- 30.  Extrapolating further, exposure to the 
U.S. general public annual limit of 100 mrad per year above background levels would 
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increase the probability of contracting cancer by 0.008 %, less than a single individual in 
our population of 5000.   
1. Psychological Effects 
Radiation illness symptoms in a few first responders can have a devastating 
psychological effect on the entire first responder crew.  This acute anxiety has the 
potential of becoming the dominant concern of the crew and detracts from attention to 
other hazards.  Psychological effects can greatly increase the potential of injury from 
conventional hazards. 
The same applies to the general public in the area. 
The severity of the psychological effects of an RDD will depend on the nature of 
the RDD material and upon the method of deployment.  The physical injury sustained 
from a RDD may be due only to the blast, but misinterpretation of the explosion as a 
nuclear detonation may induce fear similar to that produced from a true nuclear 
detonation.  Mass psychosomatic symptoms due to unrealistic fear of the effects of 





































III. RESPONDING TO RADIATION THREATS 
A. RADIATION THREAT SCENARIOS 
First responders must be prepared to adequately treat injuries complicated by 
ionizing radiation exposure and radioactive contamination.  In most scenarios, the 
radioactive contamination containment will provide a bigger challenge than the 
immediate radiation effect.   
Nuclear detonation and other high-dose radiation situations are the most critical, 
though least likely, events for concern.  Acute high-dose radiation may occur in three 
situations: first, a nuclear detonation that produces extremely high dose rates from 
radiation generated during the initial minute (prompt radiation) as well as from fission 
products in the fallout area near ground zero; a nuclear reaction which results if high-
grade nuclear materials are allowed to form a critical mass, releasing large amounts of 
gamma and neutron radiation without a nuclear explosion; finally, a radioactive release 
from a radiation dispersal device (RDD) made from highly radioactive material such as 
cobalt-60 can result in a dose sufficient to cause acute radiation injury.xxii Although 
many of the considerations in this report are applicable to the first two situations, our 
concern is with the third, the radioactive release from a RDD.  Acute effects are 
considered a worst case for an RDD event.  In most cases the radiation is too dispersed to 
pose an acute threat and even the initial amount of radioisotope may be too low to pose a 
significant acute threat. 
An RDD is any dispersal device causing purposeful dissemination of radioactive 
material across an area without a nuclear detonation.  Parties with conventional weapons 
and access to radionuclides can develop an RDD.  RDDs cause conventional casualties to 
become contaminated with radionuclides and complicate medical treatment and 
evacuation from the area. 
A discussion of radiation threat scenarios needs to recognize what is common 
with and what is different between each of the three types of events.  The medical 
consequences of radiological events are extrapolated from what we know from nuclear 
detonations and reactor accidents, most notably the effects from the atomic bomb in 
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki and from the reactor accident at Chernobyl.  In the event of an 
RDD attack, one needs to recognize the difference in magnitude between such an attack 
and bombs or reactors.  Most contemplated RDD scenarios are orders of magnitude 
smaller than those occurring during a nuclear bomb or major reactor accident. 
 
B. EXPLOITABLE RADIOACTIVE SOURCES 
Radiation sources that may be exploitable for use in a radiation dispersal device 
include, but are not limited to: sources related to medical diagnosis and therapy; those 
obtained from the nuclear fuel cycle and reactors; those used by academia and research 
facilities; sources used by industry; various components of weapons systems; naturally 
occurring and consumer product sources.  Natural sources and some consumer products 
only pose a major threat when they have been processed for use.  These sources typically 
have longer half-lives and thus less specific activity.  The most likely sources of 
radioactive isotopes are those used in industrial and medical applications.  Isotopes such 
as strontium-90 and cobalt-60 have applications in generators and food irradiation, while 
cesium-137 and cobalt-60 are used in different types of gauges and in medical treatment.  
These sources are discussed in more detail later in this report.  
 
C. TYPES OF RADIATION EFFECTS 
Generally, two types of radiation exposure exist.  Those that result in external 
exposure in which irradiation comes from a source outside of the body and those that 
result in contamination in which radioactive material comes in contact with the body or 
enters the body.  Contamination and external exposure are not necessarily exclusive, they 
may occur together. 
By simply removing the victim from the vicinity of an external source or by 
shielding the source, exposure is greatly reduced or even eliminated.  The caregiver or 
first responder is not in danger of receiving a radiation dose from the victim because 
external exposure does not create a secondary source of radiation.  The victim does not 
become radioactive and does not pose a threat to other individuals. 
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Contamination, on the other hand, results when a victim’s body has radioactive 
materials on or in it, making the victim a source of radiation.  Internal contamination can 
result from inhalation, ingestion, direct absorption through the skin, or penetration of 
radioactive materials through open wounds.  External contamination may be the result of 
materials being deposited by direct contact with the source or by radioactive materials 
spread by the explosion.  When dealing with contamination, the caregiver or first 
responder may need to approach the situation quite differently. 
  
D. EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION 
The first responder may come in contact with radionuclides in the vicinity of an 
RDD incident, and become externally contaminated.  However, if an individual is 
wounded in a contaminated area, he may become an internally contaminated patient.  The 
radiation hazard of the injured personnel to both patient and attending medical personnel 
will be negligible, so necessary medical or surgical treatment should not be delayed 
because of possible contamination.  Unlike chemical contaminants, radiological materials 
active enough to be an immediate threat can be detected at great distances. 
Radiation detectors can easily locate external radioactive materials.  The most 
common contaminants will primarily emit alpha and beta radiation whose range is short, 
so protective clothing will easily shield the body from their effects.  Beta emitters when 
left directly on the skin will cause significant burns and scarring.  Alpha radiation will not 
penetrate the outer layer of skin.  External contamination of the skin and hair is 
particulate matter than can be washed off.  It is usually not possible for a patient to be so 
contaminated that he is a radiation hazard to health care providers.   
Simple hygiene can prevent beta-induced skin ulceration and is rare in climates 
where people are fully clothed (arms, legs and neck covered).  Washing off contaminants 
can prevent beta skin damage.  If practical, the effluent should be sequestered and 
disposed of separately and appropriately.  However, in treating patients, concern about 
radioactive contamination should be secondary to treatment for physical injury.  The 





Table 4. Dose Effects on Radiation Dermatitis (From Ref.xxiii)  
 
 Dose (Sv) Dose (rem) Effect 
Acute 6-20 600-2000 Erythema only 
 20-40 2000-4000 Skin breakdown in two weeks 
 >3000 >300000 Immediate skin blistering 
       
Chronic >20 >2000 Dermatitis with cancer risk 
 
As can be seen in the table above the beta doses required for significant skin 
effects are considerable.  Proper hygiene will prevent skin damage effects.  It is 
important to understand that simply being exposed to radiation does not make a 
person radioactive.  However, if a person walks in, breathes, or in any way touches 
contamination there is a potential for that person to become contaminated, either 
externally or internally.  Once a person is contaminated, they are constantly exposed to 
radiation and its effects. 
1. Decontamination 
Decontamination is usually performed during the care of the patient by 
emergency service and, ideally, prior to arrival at medical facilities.  This may not always 
be practical.  However, it should be recognized that simple removal of outer clothing and 
shoes might effect a reduction of greater than 90 % of a patient’s contamination. 
The presence of radiological contamination can be readily confirmed by passing a 
radiation detector (radiac) over the entire body.  Open wounds should be covered prior to 
decontamination.  Contaminated clothing should be carefully removed and placed in 
marked plastic bags.  Bare skin and hair should be thoroughly washed, and the effluent 
should be sequestered.  Both contaminated clothing and effluent should be stored in a 
secure location within a contaminated area for later appropriate disposal or analysis. 
Radiological contamination should never interfere with medical care.  Unlike 
chemical agents, radioactive particles will not cause acute injury and decontamination 
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that is sufficient to remove chemical agents is more than sufficient to remove radiological 
contamination. 
 
E. INTERNAL CONTAMINATION 
Internal contamination results when radioactive material is introduced into the 
body by inhalation, ingestion, or by absorption through the skin.  The first responder 
cannot easily determine if internal contamination has occurred unless it is relatively high.  
Even if internal contamination is detected, it cannot be readily addressed at the scene.  
Internally contaminated individuals must be moved to a medical facility for treatment.  
Radionuclides react with the body chemically in the same way that the stable isotopes 
react with the body.  For example, strontium-90 is chemically similar to calcium, thus it 
tends to collect in the bones.  Iodine-129 and iodine-131 are taken up by the thyroid and 
cause damage there.  Both isotopes of iodine are produced as products of fission reactions 
either in reactors or in nuclear detonations and as such are not a real concern for RDDs.10   
The biological interactions that result as a consequence of internal contamination 
mean that special chemical and physical treatments are needed.  These treatments may 
only be available at a medical facility.  Gastric lavage is effective within the first two 
hours of uptake; antacids can reduce absorption, those containing aluminum are 
especially effective against strontium; cathartics can be used to minimize radiation time 
in the bowel.  Other chemical treatments include Prussian bluexxiv to combat cesium; 
chelating agents including DTPA (diethylenetriaminepentaacetate) or EDTAxxv 
(ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid) are used for some metals, such as americium and other 
transuranics; aluminum phosphate or barium sulfate can also be used for strontium 
ingestion.xxvi       
 
 
                                                 
10 Potassium iodide tablets are often stated to be the universal treatment for internal radiation 
contamination, however they are only useful in combating radioactive iodine such as I-129 or I-131.  I-131 
has a half-life of around 8 days, which is too short lived to be feasible as an RDD weapon and I-129 has a 
half-life of 16 million years, which decreases its specific activity and effectiveness as an RDD weapon.     
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 F. DETECTION AND INSTRUMENTATION 
Radiation is not detectable by human senses; it does not have a distinctive smell 
or taste, and it cannot be seen or felt.  Though an extremely high dose of beta radiation 
may feel hot, there is nothing to indicate that the source of the heat is in fact radiation.  
The consequence of radiation’s escape from human detection is that an RDD event 
cannot immediately be classified as such.  Radiation dispersed by a dirty bomb or by 
some other means must be identified as quickly as possible to facilitate appropriate 
response.   Some type of instrument is needed to assist the first responder in determining 
if radiation is present and if so, to what level. 
There are many types of instruments with varying size and capability.  Some 
detectors simply clip on to external clothing and record overall exposure while others 
belong in the laboratory and provide a full spectrum of information about a sample.  The 
first responder needs something in between: an instrument that is simple to use, reliable, 
and alerts the user to dangerous levels of radiation.  Instruments that might be useful to 
first responders include electronic dosimeters, personal radiation alert systems, and 
isotope identification units.xxvii 
A dosimeter is a device that records the radiation dose received by the user over a 
period of time.  A thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) is a device that contains a piece 
of radiation sensitive material and must be processed to render information about 
exposure.  These devices are generally called film badges.  An electronic dosimeter uses 
silicon chips or Geiger-Muller tubesxxviii to provide an instantaneous warning.  Electronic 
dosimeters are useful in that they immediately detect large amounts of radiation and 
protect from overexposure, and operate over a wide range of exposures using little 
power.xxix  There are some models that offer very small sizes though they compromise on 
detection range and overall features.xxx  Other instruments are built to military 
specifications and may be useful to first responders facing similar harsh environments.xxxi  
These devices alone may not be enough to detect the use of an RDD because the radiation 
is dispersed and may not be strong enough, however they are useful for providing an easy 
to understand warning. 
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Personal radiation alert systems are more sophisticated than electronic dosimeters 
in that they are much more sensitive and can locate smaller amounts of radiation.  They 
detect radiation using a method known as scintillation.xxxii  Scintillation depends on a 
sensitive material that responds to incident radiation.  The response of the material can be 
measured and calibrated to indicate the appropriate level of radiation.  These systems are 
very sensitive and as such do not work well in a high dose region.  Personal radiation 
alert systems are useful for determining if a dirty bomb has been detonated but may not 
appropriately alert the user to a dangerous situation.  These devices are more suited to 
inspecting with greater sensitivity, though greater sensitivity means the unit is larger than 
a pocket device.xxxiii  More training is required for the proper use of these tools in order to 
understand the information that the instrument provides.  Misinterpretation of the 
instrument may mean that victims are not properly cared for.                      
Isotope identification units are also very sensitive and would be useful in some 
situations.  These instruments can detect changes in the background level of radiation.  
However, because of their complexity and the type of information provided, in general, 
they require extensive training or experienced personnel to be used properly.  A few 
instruments of this type are available that require limited training and offer other operator 
friendly features.xxxiv  The advantages of this class of instruments are that they can, with 
relatively good reliability, determine which isotopes are present.  Using gamma 
spectroscopyxxxv and a built in database of spectra the instrument is able to provide 
isotope data.  Gamma spectroscopy relies on the gamma energies given off by most 
radioactive isotopes.  Each isotope radiates with unique gamma energies. When taken 
together a spectrum of energies is produced resulting in a unique “fingerprint” for each 
isotope.  Some instruments have detectors based on sodium iodide crystalxxxvi that can be 
more effective than germanium detectors and reduce exposure to the user.xxxvii  These 
instruments are generally expensive, though not prohibitively so on the regional level.  
They are valuable to the first responder however.  They can identify the isotopes likely to 
be used in a dirty bomb, which can aid in directing the response and treatment of 
individuals.   
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Responding to an RDD event or a dirty bomb hinges on the ability to accurately 
and effectively determine that such an event has occurred.  Radiation is not detectable by 
human senses and the symptoms of radiation exposure may not immediately suggest such 
exposure.  As a result, instruments are needed to detect and identify radiation and 
radioisotopes.  Instruments are also needed to provide safety to first responders and give 
them the confidence needed to appropriately attend to casualties.  In the event of a dirty 
bomb, blast effects pose the greatest threat to the victims and not responding because of 
lack of detection instrumentation or misunderstanding of the tools should not be an issue.  
This section is not meant to be a recommendation as to what instruments are appropriate 
for a given situation, merely a review of some tools that are available to the first 
responder.  Need as well as cost will determine what type of instrument is appropriate.  
Instrumentation is an important aspect in responding to an RDD event, however it is not 
enough.  Understanding how to use the instrument and the information it provides results 
in the most effective response.          
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By studying historical events involving radiation dispersal and procurement of 
such materials, a better understanding of the nature of future events may be gained.  The 
response of the public as well as that of first responders highlights some of the issues 
unique to RDD and dirty bomb events.  Goiana, Brazil, the second largest radiological 
disaster after Chernobyl, illustrates what may happen if contamination is spread 
unbeknownst to the public and how fear and chaos result.  Izmailovsky Park, Russia was 
an actual malicious event, while Georgian woodcutters were accidentally exposed to 
abandoned material that could have been obtained for nefarious intentions.  Also included 
are a number of cases involving stolen Russian uranium.  While, uranium is not a viable 
isotope for a dirty bomb, it is highly sought after because it is a necessary component for 
a nuclear weapon.  Many of the isotopes useful for dirty bombs are not as highly 
protected as uranium is, as a result may be easier to obtain.  These cases should be 
considered as examples and extensions of the potential realities of an RDD event.  
Following this section, possible RDD scenarios are considered and analyzed based in part 
on information from historical cases.  
     
B. GOIANA, BRAZIL 1987 
In September of 1987 an accident involving cesium-137 caused panic and 
contamination in the city of Goiana, Brazil.  The event, while an accident, demonstrates 
how a radioisotope may be obtained and what the results of radiological dispersion are. 
An abandoned radiotherapy unit containing cesium-137 was scavenged from a 
deteriorating hospital facility.  Scavengers thought they would make some quick money 
by scrapping the machine at the junkyard.  Instead, while dismantling the equipment at 
the junkyard, the cesium container was broken and the radioactive cesium (1400 curies) 
was released.  Unbeknownst to those dismantling the machine was the dangerous 
situation they had just created.  Portions of the source were given to members of the 
junkyard owners’ family because of the blue glow that it gave off in the dark.  The glow 
enticed some people to spread the cesium on their skin because of the resulting 
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appearance.  One six-year-old girl “rubbed the powder on her body so that she glowed 
and sparkled” and later ate a sandwich with her contaminated hands.xxxviii   
It was not until a week after the cesium container was initially pried open that 
authorities became aware of the radiation leak.  The Brazilian Nuclear Energy 
Commission responded and discovered that 244 people had been contaminated, of those 
54 had to be hospitalized.  At the time, the nearest radiation treatment center was at the 
Navy hospital in Rio de Janeiro, 600 miles away from Goiana.  Ten people had to be 
airlifted to the Navy hospital.  A medical team sent by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) also responded to the situation and discovered that 20 people had been 
internally contaminated, by inhalation or ingestion.  As a result of the internal 
contamination, individuals received doses from 100 to 800 rad.  The internally 
contaminated patients were treated with a chemical know as Prussian blue (ferric 
ferrocyanide), an iron compound known to complex with cesium and aid in the removal 
process.  Treatment with Prussian blue was largely effective despite the more than one-
week delay in recognizing the problem.  Because of its similar chemistry, cesium readily 
displaces potassium in the cells and causes damage there.  As a direct result of internal 
contamination, four people died including the six-year-old girl.   
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Over 34,000 people were processed at the city’s Olympic soccer stadium and 
examined with survey meters to screen for contamination.  Only around 250 of the more 
than 34,000 people were contaminated, illustrating the concern even an accidental 
radiological dispersion causes.  How much more would the panic and concern be in the 
event of a malicious radiological dispersion event?  Though this was a very large-scale 
incident, many of the technicians who were screening people did not wear any type of 
protective equipment, and decontamination of the ambulances was also neglected for a 
number of days.  Three different junkyards and one home were determined to have the 
largest amount of contamination, while 85 other homes were also contaminated as well as 
much of the downtown area of the city.  Nearly half of the contaminated homes were 
evacuated, some even demolished.  Some of the contamination was able to be removed, 
however a great deal of debris was stored in concrete drums and disposed as nuclear 
waste.  The cost of cleanup was tremendous, but the long-term economical impact to the 
downtown area is undetermined. 
 C. IZMAILOVSKY PARK, MOSCOW, RUSSIA 1995 
On November 23, 1995, a package that contained cesium-137 was discovered 
hidden under a bench in the popular Izmailovsky Park in Russia.  The package weighed 
about 32 kg, however, the majority of the weight was likely shielding.  The source of the 
cesium-137 is likely from a medical instrument or industrial gauge.  A reporter from 
Russia’s Independent Television Channel, responding to a tip from Chechen rebel leader 
Shamil Basayev, discovered the package.  The cesium-137 was not linked to any 
explosive nor was any local contamination indicated.  However, undiscovered the 
cesium-137 could have affected thousands of people passing through the busy park for 
weeks or months.  This event demonstrates the willingness of terrorist to use radiological 
sources as well as the reality of obtaining such sources. 
 
D. INGURI RIVER, NORTHWESTERN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA, 2001 
In December of 2001, a group of three Georgian woodcutters working in a remote 
forest discovered an orphaned Soviet era radiothermal generator (RTG).  RTGs were 
used by the Soviets as power sources for radio communication equipment and 
navigational beacons positioned in remote locations.  Soviet RTGs are powered by 
radioactive strontium-90 or cesium-137, and typically contain about 40,000 curies of 
activity.  The entire unit is about 60 to 120 cm in length while the actual radioactive core 
is about the size of a flashlight and is completely surrounded by lead shielding.  
Electricity is generated when a transformer converts the heat produced by beta particle 
collision with a titanium based ceramic sheath heated to more than 900 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  Typically, RTGs do not pose a radiation threat when the lead shielding is 
intact, but over the years since the Soviet break up, many derelict units have been lost, 
damaged, or are simply unaccounted for.   
It was one of these derelict RTGs that the Georgian woodcutters discovered in 
December of 2001.  The heat from the RTG had melted the snow and revealed itself to 
the men.  Employing the heat from the RTG, the men settled in for the night.  Quickly, 
the men grew sick and became dizzy and soon noticed the effects of beta-burn, red 
peeling skin.  While the beta particles were causing external burns, gamma rays caused 
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excessive internal damage to organs.  One man recovered in three months, two others 
remained in critical condition after that same time period.   
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responded to the reports of the 
abandoned RTGs and found two in the area where the woodcutters had been.  Four other 
strontium-90 generators were found in Georgia, which the IAEA believe are the final lost 
generators in that country.  Truly, there is no way of knowing if or when all the 
generators will be accounted for.  Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy has indicated that 
a factory in Estonia produced over 900 RTGs during the Soviet era, some that are five 
times as powerful as the ones the woodcutters discovered.xxxix There are presently still 
hundreds of RTGs that are unaccounted for, predominantly in remote areas of Russia and 
former Communist States.  Again, the woodcutters discovered the strontium-90 generator 
by accident and did not know what it was, but a terrorist looking for a ready source of 
radioactivity may have to look no further than a lost RTG. 
 
E. STOLEN RUSSIAN URANIUM 
While uranium-235 is not particularly useful for radiological dispersion devices, it 
is highly sought after because it is a fissionable material.  As a result, facilities that use 
U-235 generally have a much higher level of security.  Much of the material that is stolen 
or scrupulously obtained comes from Russia or Eastern European sources control is less 
active.  The following three cases describe how various amounts of U-235 were obtained, 
but could also be applied to other isotopes, or facilities. 
1. Andreeva Guba Naval Base   
On July 29, 1993, 1.8 kg of uranium fuel rods (36% U-235) were stolen from 
Andreeva Guba Naval Base on the Kola Peninsula in Russia.  Two men that worked at 
the base, the guard and another sailor, were able to cut the alarm wire that ran down a 
hallway and move undetected to the storage area where the lock was pried off with a 
metal bar.  Two fuel rods were taken and the men removed the uranium and cached it in 
the woods outside of the base.  The men eventually confessed and the fuel rods were 
recovered.  This facility, like most, keeps outsiders out but does little to prevent 
personnel from moving freely about the base and acting outside of imposed security 
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measures.  This type of theft seems most probable for obtaining isotopes considering the 
potential financial gain, and the easy access of the insiders. 
2. Sevmorput Naval Shipyard 
On November 27, 1993, 4.5 kg of uranium fuel rods (20% U-235) were stolen 
from the Sevmorput Naval Shipyard in the northern part of the city.  Two officers, 
Aleksei Tikhomirov and Oleg Baranov drove to the base to execute a plan developed by 
the younger brother of Tikhomirov, Dimitri, who worked at the base. Tikhomirov cut a 
hole in the fence while Baranov waited in the car.  Tikhomirov was able to saw through 
the lock on the storage bunker, pry the door open, and remove the uranium from three 
fuel rods.  Both men easily escaped with the uranium and the theft was not discovered 
until the next afternoon.  Had Tikhomirov not forgotten to replace the lock as planned, 
the theft probably would have been left undiscovered for a long time as the bunker 
contained hundreds of fuel rods to conceal the absence of three.  The men eventually 
slipped up while trying to sell the uranium and the material was recovered.  Again, inside 
knowledge of the shipyard and inadequate security led to the success of this theft. 
3. Yuri Smirnov and Luch Scientific Production Association 
In May of 1992, Yuri Smirnov began stealing highly enriched uranium (90% 
HEU) from Luch Scientific Production Association, the factory he worked at.  Smirnov 
worked in a laboratory that did research for spacecraft reactors and so had daily access to 
highly enriched uranium.  In 1992, as massive inflation hit the Russian economy, 
Smirnov decided to pad his salary by selling uranium when he learned about the street 
value from a newspaper article.  Despite the internal controls on the uranium, which 
factored in a 3% book loss of material, Smirnov was able to skim about 1% of the 
uranium he worked with by being extremely careful.  A couple of times each month he 
would walk out of the factory with a 50 g vial of HEU.  His coworkers never suspected 
the loss of material, nor did they ever see him taking any uranium.  The factory did not 
have any detectors at the exits and each worker was individually responsible for checking 
his own hands for contamination.   
When Smirnov decided that he had collected enough uranium, a final mass of 
1.532 kg, he began his plan to sell the uranium.  The plan included storing the uranium in 
a locker at one of the train stations in the city.  Unfortunately for him, when he was 
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transporting the uranium to the station he met some drunk neighbors on the platform who 
recognized him and began to talk.  In an unrelated incident the police were after the 
neighbors and so arrested everyone in the group.  It was not until they had reached the 
police station that they discovered the true identity of the material in the lead lined 
containers.  While 1.5 kg is not enough HEU to produce a nuclear weapon, it is a 
poignant example of how even materials that should require strict security measures can 




































V. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, with the increasing possibility of an RDD or dirty bomb attack, 
more and more effort has been taken to create scenarios that allow for analysis of such 
attacks.  Numerous governmental and independent agencies have worked together to play 
out these scenarios either on paper or in reality.  Using these scenarios as a preparation 
tool and for risk assessment provides first responders with an understanding of not only 
their specific role but a view of the whole picture.  The Federation of American Scientist 
(FAS) presented their findings on three specific scenarios to the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on March 6, 2002.xl  The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) analyzed a simulation of a 4000-pound dirty bomb in March of 2004.xli  Between 
May 12 and May 16, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security conducted the largest 
terrorism response exercise to date in the United States, including a scenario that 
involved an RDD attack on the city of Seattle.xlii  The event was known as TOPOFF 2 for 
Top Officials Exercise Series.  On November 14, 2002, the county of Los Angles ran an 
exercise known as Operation Critical Response involving the use of RDDs.xliii 
A simulation and resulting analysis by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies again confirmed the most generally accepted results of a dirty bomb attack.  In 
March of 2004, CSIS simulated the detonation of a 4000-pound dirty bomb loaded in a 
school bus parked outside of the National Air and Space Museum.xliv  The museum was 
almost totally destroyed by the blast with neighboring buildings experiencing damage as 
well.  CSIS estimated there were 10,000 people in the immediate area at the time of the 
blast, but were unable to give a casualty estimate.  They did agree to the extent of 
immediate casualties, however both deaths and serious injuries were due to the blast 
effects.  Contamination did spread as far as southern Pennsylvania, though the worst was 
localized to a few blocks.  Individuals located in the area of highest contamination 
received a dose of about 5 rem in one hour, equivalent to the occupational dose for one 
year set by the EPA and NRC.xlv  A person outside of the most contaminated areas, out to 
about a mile away, would require weeks of exposure to exceed the recommended yearly 
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dose.  The simulation performed by CSIS produces and confirms the most accepted 
effects and risks associated with a dirty bomb attack        
What follows now is a summary of additional scenarios and models, including the 
general results and analysis provided in the report.  This paper also discusses the 
feasibility or likelihood of the proposed scenarios and presents some conclusions.  
Conclusions are made by looking at the analysis within the report itself and in 
conjunction with independent analysis and historical cases.  The scenarios presented by 
the FAS are the most specific and relate to actual radioactive material, while the 
TOPOFF 2 exercise and Los Angles County’s Operation Critical Response deal more 
with first responder coordination and items of general concern when dealing with an 
RDD.    
 
B. FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS REPORT 
As described earlier, Henry Kelly from the Federation of American Scientist 
testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  In his testimony he 
describes why dirty bombs pose a threat to the American population as well as how a 
person might obtain the necessary materials to build a dirty bomb.  He also outlines three 
potential scenarios involving different sources of radioactivity and analyzes the results of 
such attacks.  Following, is a summary of the FAS determination of a dirty bomb threat 
along with their conclusions.  In addition, this paper further explores each scenario and 
describes the feasibility and potential danger of such attacks. 
In introducing his presentation to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Henry Kelly makes three conclusions about dirty bombs in the United States.  First, that 
radiological attacks constitute a credible threat because of the many under secured 
sources located at sites across the country, as well as the ease of dispersing the sources in 
an urban area.  Second, that such an attack would result in some deaths (from radiation 
exposure), but contamination would affect large urban areas beyond EPA guidelines.  
Finally, those areas on the order of tens of city blocks would face contamination levels 
that would cause even a small number of radiation casualties and would require 
immediate evacuation and cause widespread fear.  Demolition may be the only feasible 
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remedy and in a place such as New York City, the cost could mount into the trillions of 
dollars.   
Radioactive isotopes are commonly used in a variety of consumer and industrial 
products.  From cancer treatment, food and medical sterilization, oil exploration, smoke 
detectors, to laboratory research, isotopes are important for doing specific work.  For this 
reason, there are many sources of isotopes available to the terrorist that may or may not 
be well secured.  Cobalt-60 and cesium-137 are gamma sources used to kill cancer cells 
and bacteria, but can also harm normal human cells.  Americium-241 and plutonium-238 
are alpha sources, which only pose an internal hazard to the human body.  Americium is 
used in the fabrication of smoke detectors and for locating oil under ground.  Plutonium, 
while being a fuel for some power reactors and for nuclear weapons, it is often used in 
laboratory research as well.  Typically, there is strict regulation of these types of sources, 
but when their usefulness declines, so do the appropriate security measures.  Even in the 
United States, sources have been left in junkyards, buildings and vehicles.   
The FAS, because of likely availability of the necessary isotopes, chose the 
following scenarios for evaluation.  Americium is taken from a well-logging source, 
cesium from an abandoned medical gauge in North Carolina, and cobalt from a food 
irradiation facility.  The actual effects of any scenario depend largely on the amount of 
material used (both conventional explosive and radioactive isotope), the strength of the 
material, the direction and speed of the wind as well as other weather characteristics, the 
size of the particles which would affect how well they are carried by the wind or inhaled, 
and the size and location of nearby structures.  FAS estimate that their scenario 
predictions may be too high or low by a factor of ten.  Assumptions for the scenarios 
include: a calm day with wind speed less than one mile per hour; distribution is by 
explosion that creates a mist of fine particles that spreads downwind; and that people are 
exposed to radiation in different ways.  Exposure is by initially inhaled dust, the 
assumption being that 20% of the material is small enough to be inhaled; by continuous 
inhalation of material that has settled but is kicked up by wind, cars, or pedestrian 
movement; and by contaminated food and water sources in rural areas.  Guidelines for 
response are based on EPA procedure, including evacuations and medical attention.  
43 
Decontamination by sandblasting or demolition that cannot reduce cancer danger to 
under one-in-ten thousand means the area would have to be abandoned.                
1. Americium-241 
The scenario involves the release of Am-241 obtained from a mining or well-
logging application detonated with one pound of TNT.  The FAS scenario does not 
specify the strength of the source used in their analysis.  A typical well-logging source is 
from 3-20 Cixlvi in strength.  Based on the loss of a well-logging source around February 
4, 2002 by BNP Petroleum, this analysis assumes a source of 16 Ci of Am-241.xlvii  FAS 
estimates that people in an area ten times that of the blast area would require medical 
attention (based solely on radiation exposure, not blast affects), while an area 300 times 
that of the blast area would need to be evacuated within one half an hour.  Initial 
inhalation and subsequent inhalation would pose the greatest threat and people within a 
two-block radius of the blast would have a cancer death probability of one-in-a-
thousand.xlviii  An area of about sixty blocks would be contaminated beyond EPA 
standards. 
 Am-241 is used in oil well-logging applications because when combined with 
stable beryllium (Be), it produces a constant flux of neutrons.   
241Am(α) + 9Be Æ 12C + no 
The neutrons are used for neutron activation analysis (NAA), which relies on 
neutrons to create radioactive species in the rock and soil that in turn produce a 
characteristic spectrum.xlix  Americium is the most commonly used source, but radium-
226 and plutonium-238 in combination with beryllium have also been used.l  All of these 
isotopes are sources of alpha particles.   
 
Table 5. Americium-241 
 
Specific Activity 3.428 Ci/g 
Half Life 432 yrs 
 
The Am-241 proposed in this scenario is a 16 Ci source with a mass of 4.665 g. 
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This source would be easily shielded due to the low energy gamma emission and 
the alpha particles.  Anything that shields the gammas is enough to contain the alphas.  In 
this case a very thin piece of lead or other dense metal would shield the gamma energy.  
When dealing with gamma rays, shielding is used to reduce the amount or flux of the 
energy.  Shielding material does not change the magnitude of the energy, however the 
flux is reduced in an exponential manner.  Lead is often used as a standard material to 
reference the amount of shielding needed to reduce the flux by 10 or 100 times.li  In 
reality many types of materials are used depending on the application and cost.  In large 
reactors and laboratories, many feet of concrete and steel constitute the majority of 
shielding.      
Inhalation of dispersed particles would be the most dangerous aspect in this 
scenario, because of the longer half-life of Am-241 and the alpha particles could then 
interact internally with the body.  Alpha particles have a high linear energy transfer and 
thus lose most of their energy in a very short distance; as a result the outer layers of skin 
easily shield them.  Internally, however, large amounts of energy are directly deposited in 
one area.  
There have been cases where an Am-241 source has been lost, sometimes during 
transportation, as was the case on April 5, 1978 when a 2.8 Ci source fell off of a truck in 
transit to a job site.  The source was later recovered 110 miles from the facility by a 
highway construction worker, 15 feet from the road.lii  Sometimes the source is lost 
thousands of feet below the surface of the earth and not readily available to terrorists, as 
was the case with BNP.  In 2002, BNP Petroleum lost a 16 Ci Am-241 source while 
drilling on Padre Island, Texas.  The source was unrecoverable and left at a depth of 
about 10,500 feet and capped with a concrete plug.liii        
Another ready source of Am-241 is smoke detectors.  Based on readily available 
product information, the typical detector contains about 1 µCiliv or about 0.29 µg of Am-
241.   
1 x 10-6 Ci / 3.428 Ci/g = 0.29 x 10-6 g (0.29 µg) 
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Americium-241 is typically used in smoke detectors as a source of ionizing 
radiation.  Inside of a smoke detector, the ionization chamber houses the Am-241.  Alpha 
radiation given off by the Am-241 knocks off electrons from air molecules and creates 
charged particles.  These charged particles move between the biased plates of the 
ionization chamber and create a very small but discernable current.  When smoke enters 
the chamber, ionization is interfered with, causing a current drop and the alarm to sound.    
Thus, to equal the strength of a 16 Ci oil well-logging device, a potential terrorist 
would need to amass around 16 million smoke detectors. 
16 Ci / 1 x 10-6 Ci/smoke detector = 16 million smoke detectors 
While smoke detectors are a real and available source of americium, they do not 
pose a significant threat because of the vast numbers required to make a source 
comparable strength to a logging device.  Most homes in the United States contain at 
least one smoke detector and people are comfortable with them whether or not they are 
aware of the radiation.  As a result a weapon made from smoke detectors would lack both 
the killing power of the radiation as well as the fear factor typically caused by the 
unknown. 
2. Cesium-137 
The scenario involves the release of Cs-137 obtained from a lost medical device.  
The FAS refers to a medical gauge that was discovered in North Carolina and exploded 
in Washington DC using 10 pounds of TNT.  Immediate evacuation would not be 
necessary because the initial cloud of radioactivity would be relatively harmless.  A five 
city block area centered at the blast would see cancer cases of one-in-a-thousand, while a 
forty block area would be contaminated beyond EPA standards, giving a resident a one-
in-ten thousand chance of acquiring cancer.  These areas must be abandoned if 
decontamination is not effective.lv  The FAS scenario does not provide information on the 
strength of the lost North Carolina source.  However, typical medical gauge sources 
range from 0.027-27 Ci,lvi but in this analysis the gauge has 0.011 Ci of Cs-137.lvii (407 
MBq)   
Cesium-137, as well as other isotopes, is regularly used for many different 
medical applications including treatment, diagnosis and research.  The gamma energy 
from cesium-137 is typically used for cancer treatment or for instrument sterilization.    
Cobalt-60 is also used for cancer treatment and sterilization and is really the only other 
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major medical isotope that would prove useful in a dirty bomb.  Other common medical 
isotopes such as copper-67, iodine-123, iodine-131, technetium-99m, and xenon-133, 
used for various treatments, imaging, and studies, are not useful in dirty bombs because 
the half-lives are all less than 8 days.  With such short half-lives, the isotopes are quickly 
rendered ineffective.  Short half-lives also imply that specific activity is relatively high 
and that these materials are dangerous in amounts useful for a dirty bomb.  The simple 
reality of a short half-life does not in itself mean that an isotope is ineffective in an RDD, 
it is just impractical to obtain, transport, build and position a weapon in such a short time.   
 
Table 6. Cesium-137 
 
Specific Activity 87.0 Ci/g 
Half Life 30.17 yrs 
 
The Cs-137 proposed in this scenario is a 0.011 Ci source with a mass of 12.6 mg. 
This source would need to be shielded with about 2 cm of lead to reduce the 0.661 
MeV gamma emissions by a factor of 10.  Because of the amount of shielding involved 
with this type of gauge, simply walking away with the source would be cumbersome.  
However, the mass of the shielding alone may not deter a source such as this one from 
being targeted for potential use in a dirty bomb.  The Goiana, Brazil case, mentioned 
earlier, illustrates that motivated people can move a source that has greater strength and is 
much heavier than this one.   
In 1987 in Goiana, Brazil a large cesium device was scavenged from a former 
clinic and ultimately resulted in the release of Cs-137.  This case is described in full 
detail earlier in this paper.  Eventually, the cesium leak caused the death of four people 
and the screening of thousands more for potential contamination. 
3. Cobalt-60 
The scenario involves the use of a Co-60 rod obtained from a food irradiation 
facility and exploded in lower Manhattan by an unspecified amount of explosive.  The 
rod has dimensions of 1” in diameter and 12” in length.  Based on FAS assumptions the 
rod has been made into particulate form.  FAS acknowledge that obtaining one of these 
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sources is much less likely than the previous scenarios.  Taking into account the specified 
dimensions and the density of cobalt, the rod has a mass of 1374.5 g.   
π x (1.27 cm)2 x 30.48 cm x 8.9 g/cm3 (density of cobalt) = 1374.5 g 
Cobalt-60 is an ideal isotope for a dirty bomb attack because of the relatively 
short half-life and the resulting high specific activity.  According to the FAS scenario, an 
area of over one thousand square kilometers would be contaminated, spreading into three 
states.  For people living within three-hundred city blocks, the risk of death from cancer 
would be one-in-ten for some forty years.  All of Manhattan Island would have a risk for 
cancer death of one-in-a-hundred and long-term contamination would result in vast 
amounts of useless space. 
 
Table 7. Cobalt-60 
 
Specific Activity 1130.36 Ci/g
Half Life 5.272 yrs 
 
The 1374.5 g Co-60 source would thus have an activity of 1.55 MCi 
This is considered a self-protecting source because of the high activity.  To shield 
the 1.33 MeV gamma, 4 cm of lead would be needed to reduce the energy by a factor of 
10, or 12 cm of lead to reduce the energy by a factor of 1000.lviii  While security at food 
irradiation facilities takes into consideration the presence of cobalt-60, the source itself is 
so powerful that it would be very difficult for a terrorist to safely obtain.  As it is, the 
legitimate movement of these sources requires much equipment, men and supervision. 
As a self-protecting source, obtaining cobalt-60 from a food irradiation facility 
presents many problems.  While the source itself is not too massive or bulky for an 
individual to carry alone, the source combined with enough shielding to make it safe 
would indeed be very cumbersome.  It is entirely possible that a terrorist will not have 
regard for his own life and attempt to remove the source with insufficient shielding.  
Moving a source of this strength without sufficient shielding is not only likely fatal to the 
person moving it but to those near by as well.  The source is also hot to the touch, further 
complicating unshielded movement.  Assuming that a cobalt source could be removed 
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from a food irradiation facility, it is not in the proper form to be dispersed as a weapon.  
The source is used in the form of a rod, thus would have to be further processed by the 
terrorist, which again involves a large amount of risk.  In order to be useful the rod must 
be filed or ground into a powder to be dispersed and inhaled.  This would again pose a 
handling and inhalation problem to the terrorist, enough so to be potentially deadly before 
a device is built or employed.  Because of the self-protecting nature of cobalt-60 sources 
found at food irradiation facilities it is unlikely that a terrorist would successfully employ 
it.  It is not impossible to obtain a self-protected source, however the casualties suffered 
during the process may not make it a valid option.  Cobalt-60 is still a useful isotope for 
dirty bombs and should not be completely disregarded as a weapon.  Smaller sources do 
exist, namely those used in hospitals for treatment and sterilization.  
Food irradiation, while recently a controversial issue, is used world wide as an 
effective means of sterilizing food before it reaches the market place.  Irradiation 
increases shelf life and also kills many types of harmful organisms.  Typically, a cobalt-
60 source is used to provide the gamma energy needed to irradiate food passed through 
the irradiation facility.  Large sources are contained in steel tubes, stored underground in 
a water chamber when not in use.  When needed, the sources are raised out of the ground 
and pallets of food items are passed through by a conveyer system.  One benefit to using 
irradiation as a food processing method is that it does not cause a significant rise in the 
temperature of the food.  Treatment at stable, room temperatures allows the food to retain 
most of its nutritional value and natural flavors.  Another benefit of using strong sources 
of gamma energy is that the food can be irradiated in its final packaging material.  None 
of the packaging material or food items become radioactive and the products are safe for 
shipping.lix  The strength of cobalt-60 used in food irradiation facilities may seem to be a 
nice one-stop shop for dirty bomb material, but the strength of the source and its rod form 
render it self-protected.   
4. Conclusions 
Henry Kelly from the Federation of American Scientist paints a very grim and far 
reaching picture to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  He describes what might 
happen to a city that is affected by an attack using americium-241, cesium-137, or cobalt-
60.  While, clearly these attacks do pose a threat to the population, the likelihood of each 
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attack varies. The most probable attacks are those using sources obtained from industry, 
such as americium-241 or sources obtained from a medical facility, such as cesium-137.  
The scenario involving cobalt-60 obtained from a food irradiation facility is the least 
likely due to the self-protecting nature of the source itself.   
Dr. Kelly suggests that in order to minimize the threat of a dirty bomb, 
opportunities for possessing and availability of radioactive isotopes must be minimized 
first.  In addition, early detection systems need to be in place and utilized, and the public 
must be educated as to real and imagined threats in order to keep casualties resulting 
from panic and chaos to a minimum.lx  One of the biggest reasons isotopes become 
available to a terrorist is because when they are no longer useful, appropriate security or 
disposal do not exist.  The high cost of properly handling materials in industrial facilities 
and at medical centers provides the greatest opening for terrorist.  When an attack occurs 
first responders must have an effective way of determining that radiation actually is an 
issue.  Following that, they need to know how to protect themselves and the rest of the 
general population.  Knowledge in these areas will prevent the casualties of fear and 
chaos that quickly overload the response system.lxi 
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Objective analysis of the scenarios studied by the FAS show that indeed the 
isotopes considered do present a credible threat.  Based on availability, cesium-137 is 
most likely to be used, followed by americium-241, and finally cobalt-60.  From strictly 
an energetic point of view, cobalt and cesium are both desirable because they are gamma 
emitters and pose an external threat to contaminated individuals as well as an internal 
threat.  Americium is an alpha emitter and thus is essentially harmless to an externally 
contaminated person because alpha particles do not penetrate skin.  Internal americium 
contamination is a concern however because of the high amount of energy that alpha 
particles deposit locally.  The long-term effects, centering on the risk of death from 
cancer, are overestimated however.  Charles B. Meinhold, president emeritus of the 
National Council on Radiation Protection says, “studies of those survivors [of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki bombings] since 1950 show that of 86,572 people exposed to levels of 
radiation thousands of time greater than a dirty bomb could produce, cancer deaths 
exceeded the expected numbers for that population by 335.”lxii  The numbers used by the 
FAS to describe the cancer risk are very high and do not represent an accurate picture of 
the risks associated with living in an area that has been attacked by a dirty bomb.  The 
greatest long-term effect of such an attack may not be entirely calculable.  Economic 
damage to a city would be high and far-reaching, as buildings may have to be 
demolished, disrupting trade and business.  Another factor that could harm an areas 
economic potential is the stigma that arises because of radioactive contamination, 
whether or not the area is fully decontaminated. 
Overall, these scenarios illustrate how fear, chaos, and economic loss will pose 
the greatest challenges to a city and its first responder struck by a dirty bomb.  Initial 
casualties in such an attack will be isolated to those caused by blast effects, with a very 
small chance of any acute radiation dose deaths.  Even long-term deaths associated with 
exposure from a typical dirty bomb are likely to be small and possibly undistinguishable 
from other background causes of cancer.  The material needed to create panic is 
available, however knowledge of the realities and real threats involved with a dirty bomb 
attack will spare much undue loss. 
 
C. TOP OFFICIAL EXERCISE SERIES – TOPOFF 2 
The Department of Homeland Security designed and executed the most 
comprehensive terrorism response exercise, involving the highest levels of government, 
ever carried out in the United States.  TOPOFF 2, named for the second exercise 
involving top government officials, was conducted from May 12 to May 16, 2003.  The 
exercise involved federal, state, local (FSL), and Canadian authorities responding to a 
terrorist attack by RDD in Seattle, Washington and a pneumonic plague in Chicago.  In 
responding to these incidents, the goals were to identify weaknesses in the response 
system, improve management of extreme events, form more effective interlocking 
management systems, validate authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures and 
protocols, and finally to improve the national training program for extreme events.lxiii  
Incorporated into the design of TOPOFF 2 was an introduction to specific scenarios. This 
allowed the actors to be increasingly aware of the situation and fostered a more 
complicated exercise. 
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In reviewing the exercise and determining how to further meet these stated goals, 
the focus was more on the decision and coordination process rather than particularities of 
the actual events.  This type of analysis is likely to be of interest to first responders 
because it provides insight into practical issues that should be considered during an RDD 
attack.  While the previously described scenario involving a FAS analysis dealt with a 
specific type of attack, and the nature and consequences of the attack, a TOPOFF 2 
analysis should provide insight in a broader sense.  Two critical decisions that this 
exercise allowed involved raising the homeland security threat condition to Red by 
various levels of FSL authorities and requesting Presidential declarations to address RDD 
and bioterrorism attacks.  Most relevant to an RDD attack were the issues of data 
collection and coordination and the safety of the first responders verses that of rescuing 
casualties.  
1. Data Collection    
Collecting data is the job of many FSL agencies and requires compilation 
processing at many different locations.  The refined data is then given to top officials help 
guide their decision making process.  Data collection and coordination is especially 
crucial in an RDD attack, but the Seattle scenario revealed some complications in this 
process that affected the overall response.  Coordination between all FSL authorities 
proved insufficient both at the site of the incident and at off site centers.  It became clear 
that many assets for collection are available, but coordination of those assets is more 
important.  Working with the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center is 
necessary for overall coordination.  Not only is data collection critical in the case of an 
RDD attack, so is additional education among first responders and decision makers.  
Know what information is relevant at what time as well as the value of different models 
such as the one used in the FAS analysis.  Models may be useful to some extent, however 
as actual data is collected a real picture is created and the value of a model decreases.  
This paper seeks to provide some of the necessary education as well as identify areas that 
need further consideration.   
2. First Responder Safety 
The issue of safety of the first responder verses the rescue of victims is also 
addressed by the TOPOFF 2 exercise.  When dealing with an RDD attack, responders 
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have a greater chance of becoming a casualty because they can be contaminated by the 
effects of the device or by a contaminated victim.  The exercise allowed for an initial 
awareness of the type of attack and the fact that it involved radiation.  This knowledge 
allowed responders to proceed with the rescue operation while incident commanders 
evaluated the safety of the responders themselves.  This aspect of the exercise is a bit 
artificial because in an attack such as this, there is no initial indication that radiation 
exists.  In reality, blast effects from an RDD are immediately more life threatening than 
radiation effects and should be responded to as such.  Still it is prudent for the first 
responder to be familiar with radiation and contamination.  More communication 
between the incident commander and hospital control is needed.  Hospital control needs 
to provide to incident command a more comprehensive risk-benefit analysis in order to 
facilitate faster on scene response.  Keeping responders safe as well as rescuing victims 
requires public health, medical communities, media, and the general public to be 
educated about the facts of an RDD.  Education limits public concern and media 
sensationalism, while allowing responders to continue with their work effectively and 
safely.  A consistent message to the general public from incident command is essential in 
balancing the safety of first responders with the rescue of victims.   
3. Conclusions 
As the largest exercise ever conducted by the United States dealing with weapons 
of mass destruction, TOPOFF 2 was important in providing not only top officials with 
decision making practice, but first responders with some issues to consider.  The most 
important aspect of TOPOFF 2 for this paper was the scenario played out in Seattle, 
Washington involving the use of an RDD.  By incorporating many different FSL 
authorities, issues involving communication and coordination were revealed.  Data 
collection and processing for the RDD attack need to be improved so that a more 
effective and timely response can occur.  The safety of responders verses rescuing 
victims is another important issues during and RDD attack.  Radiation is not detectable 
by human senses, potentially resulting in a false sense of security for the responder.  
Clearly blast effects from an RDD will be the most acute concern while responding. 
However, more communication between hospital central and incident commanders in 
regards to radiation will provide greater overall safety.  TOPOFF 2 is an important 
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exercise for providing first responders with issues worth considering before responding to 
an RDD attack.  
 
D. OPERATION CRITICAL RESPONSE – LOS ANGLES COUNTY 
Each year the county of Los Angeles is required by California State law and by 
Los Angeles County Code to carry out one operational countywide emergency exercise.  
In November of 2002 an exercise called “Operation Critical Response” was conducted 
involving the use of multiple RDDs.  In California, response to such incidents is 
organized under the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) in an effort 
to enhance information flow and coordination.  By organizing under one system, 
coordination and information is available at the site of the incident, locally, in an 
operationally area, regionally, or at the state level.  The 2002 exercise involved 
explosions in Pasadena, Long Beach, Carson, Burbank, Torrance, and Santa Fe Springs 
all within the hour of 0900-1000.  Half of the explosions were dirty bombs, while two 
others had chemicals and the final explosion was a mass casualty incident.  Many 
spontaneous and simultaneous evacuations occurred due to fear and the resulting panic 
for radiation.  This scenario caused all major freeways to backup, resulting in the delay of 
aid units and overloaded hospitals with people who thought they had been exposed to 
radiation.  Air traffic is halted as most airports are closed, the homeland security threat 
condition is raised to red, and some public employees do not go to work because they feel 
targeted.  An NBC news affiliate was able to put out a 20-minute news video used to start 
to the exercise.     
The exercise, like TOPOFF 2, was used by Los Angeles County to discover issues 
and concerns dealing with communication and other logistics specific to an RDD attack.  
One thing, specifically relevant to first responders regarding dirty bombs, included the 
definition of the weapon as an area denial weapon as opposed to a mass casualty weapon.  
This was important because it effected overall coordination of the immediate response as 
well as the continuing response and asset allocation.  Severe injuries will not likely be the 
result of radiation, so it is more important to stabilize and close off an area first and test 
for radiation later.  Another issue was the large flux of people at the hospitals, especially 
in sorting out “worried well” from those that are truly contaminated.  Blast effects being 
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the most likely acute cause of death from a dirty bomb brings up the issue of how the 
coroner deals with contaminated or even potentially contaminated persons.  Other 
concerns brought out by the exercise include preventing further contamination by 
vehicles and individuals as well as maintaining the continuity of government.  These 
issues were determined by the local agencies to be the most important to address, areas of 
weakness during an RDD attack.   
Some potential solutions to the issues of concern arose from the exercise 
however.  In the case of overcrowded hospitals filled with worried well patients, local fire 
and police departments established a screening area in front of hospitals to alleviate 
unnecessary emergency room traffic.  Potentially, one of the most troublesome aspects of 
an RDD attack is actually identifying the fact that radiation is involved.  There are no 
physical indications and no way to detect radiation with human senses.  In this scenario, 
threats of attacks incorporating radiation were known, thus first responders approached 
each scene with that assumption.  In addition to the threat of radiation, once its presence 
was confirmed at one site, other responders acted accordingly to locate radiation at all 
sites.  Identifying the presence of radiation is not always easy and perhaps the best 
solution comes from intelligence and assuming its presence.  Another activity that was 
heavily relied upon in this scenario was on-site visual reports of information rather than 
plume modeling or any other predictive method.  Modeling can be useful for generating a 
likely sequence of events, however there are too many factors that need to be addressed, 
thus on-site information is most useful during a response. 
1. Conclusions   
Los Angeles County’s Operation Critical Response was an important exercise not 
only for the agencies in and around Los Angeles County, but also for the first responder 
community as a whole.  By conducting an exercise that incorporated multiple RDD 
events as well as other explosives and chemicals, many important issues and areas of 
consideration arose.  Large-scale events such as those contained in this scenario always 
demand a high level of coordination and communication.  The exercise raised specific 
concerns involving flooded hospitals, blocked freeways, and securing areas without 
causing undue panic.  Modeling again proves useful only in the general sense, while on-
site data is most important during an event.  As was the case with the TOPOFF 2 
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exercise, Operation Critical Response was a large-scale event that sought to prepare first 
responders for actual scenarios.  What can be learned from the exercises are the areas 
most likely to be relevant during an RDD event.  Overall awareness provides focus for 




In recent years the term “dirty bomb” has surfaced, thrown out by media circles, 
politicians, scientist, and the general population.  Often times people refer to the potential 
terrorist act of setting off a dirty bomb, causing destruction and uncertainty.  Most of the 
fear associated with a dirty bomb however is actually tied to the public perception that 
anything dealing with nuclear or radiological devices is dangerous.  The general 
population may have an understanding of what a dirty bomb is but typically do not really 
understand its physics or effects.  Most people are unaware of the real dangers or lack 
thereof associated with a dirty bomb.  Radiation itself is colorless, odorless, tasteless and 
otherwise undetectable by human senses without the use of instruments.  This aspect 
alone is probably the greatest weapon in the hands of a terrorist.  Unlike a nuclear bomb 
which produces its power from energy stored in the center of uranium or plutonium 
atoms, a dirty bomb simply uses a conventional explosive such as TNT or another 
modern or plastized explosive, packed with any one or a mixture of the thousands of 
radioactive isotopes in existence.  Fortunately, only a select number of radioactive 
isotopes are useful for dirty bombs because of their availability, relative strength, or half-
life.  The vast majority of isotopes are not useful to a terrorist because the half-life is too 
short to be practical, or too long to have significant activity.  Some isotopes are self-
protected and would likely kill any terrorist that attempted to move them without 
appropriate training and shielding.  Other isotopes are subjected to high security or are 
available in very small impractical quantities.  As a result, only a handful of isotopes 
truly pose an RDD threat.   
The immediate killing power of a dirty bomb is due strictly to the blast affects of 
the conventional explosive.  However in addition to destroying whatever is in close 
proximity, a dirty bomb also spreads the radioactive isotopes into the environment. The 
real effects of isotopes included in such a weapon are to create uncertainty and chaos.  
Economic damage resulting from a dirty bomb will likely be significant.  Contaminated 
areas most likely will carry a negative connotation with their name, as has been the case, 
as a result business, trade, and residents will be lost.  The resulting contamination from a 
dirty bomb should in no way hinder the first responder’s efforts to provide aid to 
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casualties however.  Improperly trained first responders can perpetuate the fear associated 
with such a weapon if they themselves drastically change the way they respond.  For 
these reasons dirty bombs, or RDDs can be called weapons of mass disruption rather than 
strictly weapons of mass destruction. 
Strictly speaking, just about anyone can build a dirty bomb because it involves 
nothing more than building a conventional bomb, the results of which are seen weekly in 
world media.  The difficult aspect in making a dirty bomb, however, is in obtaining and 
transporting the radiological material.  As a rule radioactive isotopes are considered 
dangerous and most governments have programs that monitor all radioactive material 
under their jurisdiction.  The problem lays in the areas of the world where control is less 
stringent or when radioactive materials escape from the system of control.  Most often 
this occurs in former Soviet countries or in Eastern Europe where regulation has broken 
down or simply does not exist.  Sources of radioactive material may not be as exclusive 
as the general population is led to believe.  The use of radioactive isotopes stretches into 
many aspects of life, from the obvious nuclear power plants, university and research 
laboratories to industrial gauges, medical screening and treatment equipment, and food 
irradiation facilities, to even the household smoke detector.  In the strictest sense of the 
word, a dirty bomb has not yet been used in a terrorist attack, however there are a number 
of cases in which terrorists with malicious intent have struck using radioactive isotopes.  
There are also cases in which accidents or neglect has caused the dispersal of radioactive 
material.  The potential exists for such an attack, however the key to responding to a dirty 
bomb is knowledge and education.  An educated first responder community understands 
the particularities of a radiological dispersion event and can respond in such a way as to 
save lives and minimize panic.  With a little knowledge an educated public can respond 





APPENDIX: PHYSICAL CONSTANTS AND NOTES ON 
IMPORTANT ISOTOPES 
The following tables are provided as a source of information on isotopes that are 
most likely to be used in the event of an RDD or dirty bomb.  The choice on these 
isotopes is based on availability, historical use, and practicality in terms of half-life and 
specific activity.  Physical and chemical propertieslxiv, lxv are included and remain constant 
for all isotopes of an element, while radiophysical propertieslxvi are specific to each 
individual isotope.  
 
Americium  
Atomic Number: 95 
Physical Properties: In the metallic form it is silvery-white in color and tarnishes slowly in air.        
Chemical Properties: Produced by a reduction of americium trifluoride by barium vapor. 
Hazards: All isotopes of americium are radioactive. 
Important Isotopes: Americium-241  
 Use Smoke detectors, well-logging 
 Half Life  432 years 
 Gamma Energies  0.0595, 0.0263 MeV 
 Other Energies  5.4857, 5.4430 α 
 Production Pu-241 daughter 
 Specific Activity 3.428 Ci/g 
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 Cadmium  
Atomic Number: 48 
Physical Properties: Bluish-white in color, soft, ductile, and malleable metal 
Chemical Properties: Produced as an impurity precipitated during the processing of zinc ore. 
Hazards: Toxic when inhaled, accumulates in the body 
Important Isotopes: Cadmium-113  
 Use Industrial, reactor fuel product 
 Half Life 13.7 years 
 Gamma Energies none 
 Other Energies 0.59 MeV β- 
 Production Cd-112(n,γ), fission 











 Californium  
Atomic Number: 98  
Physical Properties: Synthetic metal        
Chemical Properties: All isotopes of californium are radioactive 
Hazards: Radioactive 
Important Isotopes: Californium-252  
 Use Reactor, reactor fuel products 
 Half Life 2.64 years 
 Gamma Energies 0.0434, 0.100 MeV 
 Other Energies 6.118, 6.076 α 
 Production multiple n capture from U-238, Pu-239, Cm-244 













Atomic Number: 55  
Physical Properties: Silver-white, soft, ductile, metal. 
Chemical Properties: Decomposes in water producing free hydrogen gas and subsequent ignition.  Must be kept under kerosene. 
Hazards: Fire hazard 
Important Isotopes: Cesium-137  
 Use 
Medical and industrial use, 
often found as cesium 
chloride salt. 
 Half Life 30.17 years 
 Gamma Energies 0.66165 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.512 MeV β- 
 Production fission product 





















 Cobalt  
Atomic Number: 27 
Physical Properties: Steel gray, slightly pinkish, shiny, hard, ductile,  Slightly malleable, magnetic metal 
Chemical Properties: Slightly soluble in dilute hydrochloric and sulfuric acid, and  readily soluble in nitric acid. 
Hazards: No important hazards 
Important Isotopes: Cobalt-60  
 Use Industrial testing and food irradiation  
 Half Life 2.0 barns 
 Gamma Energies 1.3325, 1.1732 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.3179 MeV β- 
 Production Co-59(n,γ) 













Atomic Number: 72 
Physical Properties: Silver-gray, ductile, lustrous metal. 
Chemical Properties: Very corrosion resistant 
Hazards: Not toxic, fine powders can combust 
Important Isotopes: Hafnium-181 
 Use Industrial by-product 
 Half Life 42.4 days  
 Gamma Energies 0.4820, 0.1330 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.408 MeV β- 
 Production Hf-180(n,γ) 













 Iridium   
Atomic Number: 72 
Physical Properties: Silvery-white in color, hard, and brittle metal. 
Chemical Properties: Most corrosion resistant element known. 
Hazards: Uncreative, not toxic 
Important Isotopes: Iridium-192 
 Use Industrial testing 
 Half Life 73.83 days 
 Gamma Energies 0.31651, 0.46807 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.666, 0.535 MeV β- 
 Notes Also undergoes electron capture 
 Production Ir-191(n,γ) 
















 Strontium  
Atomic Number: 38 
Physical Properties: Pale yellow, soft metal 
Chemical Properties: Decomposes in water producing free hydrogen gas and subsequent ignition.  Must be kept under kerosene or naphtha oil. 
Hazards: Fire hazard  
Important Isotopes: Strontium-90  
 Use Industrial use and radiothermal batteries 
 Half Life 29.0 years 
 Gamma Energies none 
 Other Energies 0.546 MeV β- 
 Production fission product 
















Atomic Number: 73 
Physical Properties: Steel gray-blue color when unpolished and platinum white when polished 
Chemical Properties: Insoluble in acids, extremely corrosion resistant 
Hazards: No important hazards 
Important Isotopes: Tantalum-182  
 Use Industrial by-product 
 Half Life 114.5 days 
 Gamma Energies 0.06775, 1.1213, 1.22141 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.522, 0.246  MeV β- 
 Production Ta-181(n,γ) 












 Thulium  
Atomic Number: 69 
Physical Properties: Metallic, shiny, lustrous metal 
Chemical Properties: Reacts slowly with water and is soluble in dilute acid, forms green colored salts. 
Hazards: Stable in air. 
Important Isotopes: Thulium-170  
 Use Industrial testing as a portable x-ray source  
 Half Life 129 days 
 Gamma Energies 0.084252 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.968, 0.883 MeV β- 
 Notes Also undergoes electron capture 
 Production Tm-169(n,γ); Er-170(p,n)  











Atomic Number: 70 
Physical Properties: Silvery-white metallic solid, though soft and ductile. 
Chemical Properties: Quickly reacts and dissolves in acids, reacts slowly in water. 
Hazards: Not toxic 
Important Isotopes: Ytterbium-169  
 Use Industrial testing 
 Half Life 32.02 days 
 Gamma Energies 0.063121, 0.19796, 0.17721, 0.10978 MeV 
 Other Energies none 
 Notes Undergoes electron capture  
 Production 
Yb-168(n,γ); Tm-169(d,2n); 
Lu-169 daughter; protons on 
Ta 












Atomic Number: 40 
Physical Properties: Grayish-white, lustrous metal 
Chemical Properties: Very corrosion resistant 
Hazards: Not toxic, divided dust can combust 
Important Isotopes: Zirconium-93  
 Use Industrial by-product 
 Half Life 1.5x106 years 
 Gamma Energies 0.0304 MeV 
 Other Energies 0.060 MeV β- 
 Production fission product 
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